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BC POLICE ARMED WITH NEW 
ENFORCEMENT POWERS IN FIGHT 
AGAINST COVID-19
BC’s government has enacted new measures using 
the extraordinary powers of the Emergency Program 
Act (EPA) - see Ministerial Order M134. Police  and 
other provincial enforcement officers may now issue 
$2,000 violation tickets for owners or organizers 
contravening the provincial health officer’s (PHO) 
order on gatherings and events. Police will also be 
able to issue $200 violation tickets to individuals not 
following the direction of police or enforcement staff 
at events or who refuse to comply with requests to 
follow PHO orders or safe operating procedures, or 
respond with abusive behaviour.  
MOST CANADIAN’s AGREE IN POLICE 
POWER TO ARREST FOR VIOLATING 
SOCIAL DISTANCING RULES
According to a Leger survey released in July  2020 a 
majority of Canadians agree that the police should 
have the  right to issue fines or arrest people who do 
not respect social distancing measures or do not 
wear masks in places where governments make 
mask wearing mandatory. The percentages agreeing 
with such police  powers is higher that Canada’s 
neighbour to the south.
Should the police have the right to issue fines or arrest people who do not wear masks in places 
where governments make wearing masks mandatory?
Response BC AB MB/SK ON QC ATL Canada U.S.
Yes 59% 66% 76% 70% 69% 62% 68% 58%
No 32% 28% 20% 23% 25% 23% 25% 31%
Don’t know/prefer 
not to answer
8% 6% 4% 7% 6% 15% 7% 11%
Should the police have the right to issue fines or arrest people who do not respect social distancing 
rules?
Response BC AB MB/SK ON QC ATL Canada U.S.
Yes 56% 51% 66% 66% 63% 62% 62% 52%
No 33% 35% 23% 25% 27% 22% 27% 34%
Don’t know/prefer 
not to answer
12% 14% 11% 9% 10% 10% 11% 15%
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SEARCH OF VEHICLE FOR 
IDENTIFICATION PROPER AS AN 
INCIDENT TO ARREST 
R. v. Law, 2020 ABCA 267
After seeing a vehicle being driven at 
a high rate of speed in a residential 
area (estimated at about 100 km/h), 
police followed it as it made several 
turns. The vehicle was described as 
being driven in an evasive manner before it came 
to a  stop in a residential cul-de-sac. The accused 
exited the vehicle and called out to police that the 
vehicle was not registered. Since the vehicle had 
BC licence plates, the police knew immediately 
that if the vehicle was unregistered, it was also 
uninsured.
The accused was ordered back into the vehicle. But 
before returning to the  driver’s seat, the accused 
stood beside the open vehicle door, reached inside, 
and appeared to be moving items around. The 
police again ordered the  accused to re-enter the 
vehicle which he eventually did. The police  saw the 
accused’s head bobbing up and down and it 
appeared he was leaning forward in his seat.
One officer approached the driver’s side of the 
vehicle and opened the door. The accused was 
holding a few items on his lap, including a tablet 
and a notebook. He told the officer he did not have 
his driver’s licence on him but provided a name, 
which was later learned to be false. At 3:52  a.m. 
the officer advised the accused he was being 
arrested for failing to have his driver’s licence. He 
was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police 
car. 
A backup officer looked for identification in the 
vehicle. She leaned into the open driver’s side door 
and saw the butt of a shotgun protruding about one 
to two inches from under the  driver’s seat. A 
double-barrel sawed-off shotgun, with the stock cut 
off to form a pistol grip, was removed from the 
vehicle and two rounds were unloaded from it. The 
vehicle was searched further and a knife  was found 
sitting on the front seat and four live rounds of 
ammunition were found loose in the  vehicle.  After 
police found the shotgun, the accused provided his 
real name. A computer check revealed the accused 
had 11 outstanding warrants and was the  subject of 
a recognizance requiring him to remain at his 
residence 24 hours a day and not be in a motor 
vehicle without the registered owner present. He 
was also prohibited from possessing weapons.
At 4:22 a.m. the accused was Chartered and 
cautioned for breaching a recognizance and 
breaching a  firearms prohibition. At 4:44 a.m. he 
was given the opportunity  to retain and instruct 
counsel at the police station. At 10:02 a.m. he was 
arrested for the specific offences related to 
possessing the prohibited sawed off shotgun. The 
police did not attempt to elicit information from the 
accused in the period from 4:22 a.m. to 10:02 a.m. 
The accused was charged with numerous offences.
Alberta Provincial Court
The arresting officer explained the delay 
from 04:22 a.m. to 10:02 a.m. when the 
accused was arrested for the specific 
offences related to the prohibited firearm. 
The officer said he  wanted to confirm that he was 
laying the correct weapons charges. However, he 
acknowledged that he knew he would be charging 
the accused with possessing a  firearm and unsafe 
storage.
The judge concluded that the accused’s ss. 8 and 9 
Charter rights had not been breached. As for s. 9, 
the judge held the police had “ample  articulable 
cause” to detain the accused. These grounds 
included:
• The vehicle was travelling at excessive speeds in 
a residential neighbourhood.
• The activity was occurring at 3:50 a.m.
• The driver briefly appeared to be attempting to 
evade the police vehicle.
• As soon as the vehicle stopped, its driver exited 
the vehicle and began to approach the police 
truck, which the officer considered unusual and 
suspicious behaviour.
• The driver shouted out that the vehicle was not 
registered.
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• When ordered to re-enter his vehicle, the driver 
instead stood outside, leaned in, and appeared 
to be rummaging about inside it.
• When the driver re-entered the vehicle, his head 
continued to bob up and down and he appeared 
to be leaning forward and down repeatedly.
• Because the vehicle had BC licence plates, no 
registration meant that the vehicle  had no 
insurance.
• When the arresting officer approached and 
opened the driver's door and requested 
documents, the accused said he did not have his 
license with him. 
• The arresting officer knew that if he  believed on 
reasonable grounds that an unregistered vehicle 
had been driven and that the driver could not 
produce satisfactory identification, he was 
arrestable  under s. 169 of Alberta’s Traffic Safety 
Act (TSA).
As for the search and seizure, the judge opined that 
the accused had no standing to bring a s. 8 
challenge because he had not established a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 
However, the judge ruled that s. 10(a) and (b) had 
been violated. Between the time when the  accused 
had been arrested at 4:22 a.m. for the breaches and 
10:02 a.m. when he was informed of the specific 
firearms charges, the accused had not been 
informed of the full extent of his jeopardy. 
Therefore, he was unable to obtain meaningful 
legal advice when he spoke to a lawyer. 
Nevertheless, despite the s. 10 Charter breaches, 
the judge admitted the evidence of the shotgun, 
ammunition and knife into evidence because they 
had been obtained before the s. 10 breaches 
occurred. In the judge’s view, the evidence had not 
been obtained in a manner that infringed or denied 
the accused’s rights. And, even if the evidence was 
obtained in such a manner, the evidence was 
admissible under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of numerous offences related to 
weapons, recognizance breaches and possession 
contrary to an order. He was sentenced to 8.5 years 
in prison less pre-sentence custody.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued the trial 
judge made several errors. These 
errors included a finding that 
there  were no ss. 8 or 9 Charter 
breaches and that the  evidence of the shotgun, 
ammunition and knife ought to have been excluded 
under s. 24(2). In the accused’s view, he had been 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 and subjected to an 
unreasonable search under s. 8. As a result, the 
evidence obtained from these breaches, in 
BY THE BOOK:
Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act 
Arrest without warrant
s. 169(1) A peace officer may arrest 
a person without warrant if the 
peace off icer, on reasonable 
grounds, believes that
(a) the person has committed an offence in 
respect of any of the provisions set out in 
subsection (2), and
(b) the person
(i) will continue or repeat that offence if not 
arrested, or
(ii) has provided the peace officer with 
inadequate or questionable information 
as to the person’s identification.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the 
following are the provisions for which a person 
may be arrested without a warrant:
(a) sections 51(a) and  94  relating to the 
operation of a motor vehicle without having a 
subsisting operator’s licence;
(b) section 52(1)(a) and (d) relating to the 
operation of a motor vehicle without having a 
subsisting certificate of registration;
(i) section 115(2) and the Rules of the Road 
relating to the speed of motor vehicles;… 
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conjunction with the s. 10 (a) and (b) breaches 
already found, should have resulted in the evidence 
being excluded. 
Arbitrary Detention?
Although he did not dispute that his initial 
detention was not arbitrary, the accused argued his 
arrest was arbitrary because it was unlawful. He 
submitted that the arresting officer did not have the 
lawful grounds to arrest him under either Alberta’s 
TSA or s. 495(1) of the Criminal Code, and the trial 
judge did not properly analyze the issue. The 
Crown, on the other hand, contended that the 
police had the  necessary grounds to detain and 
arrest the accused under s. 169 of the TSA. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the police had 
the necessary grounds to arrest the accused under 
s. 169 on the facts as found by the trial judge. The 
Court of Appeal stated:
Reasonable grounds have both a subjective and 
objective component. An arresting officer must 
subjectively have reasonable grounds to base 
the arrest. In addition, these grounds must be 
justifiable from an objective point of view. The 
existence of the subjective reasonable grounds 
must be assessed on the totality of facts known 
to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. 
The objective component is assessed “through 
the eyes of the reasonable person with the 
experience and knowledge of the arresting 
officer”.
Reasonable grounds are more than mere 
suspicion but do not require proof on a balance 
of probabilities. [references omitted, paras. 
26-27]
Even though he did not formally arrest the accused 
under s. 169 of the TSA, the arresting officer 
subjectively believed he had reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused for driving an unregistered motor 
vehicle. The trial judge found the arresting officer 
knew the vehicle was not registered and the 
accused did not have his license  with him. As well, 
the arresting officer knew he had the grounds to 
arrest the accused under s. 169 of the TSA if he 
believed that the vehicle was unregistered and the 
driver could not produce satisfactory identification. 
As for the objective component, the Court of 
Appeal continued: 
Moreover, the trial judge’s factual findings 
establish that the arresting officer’s subjective 
belief was objectively reasonable. The 
reasonable person with experience and 
knowledge of the arresting officer would have 
had the following constellation of facts before 
her in deciding whether to arrest:
1. The [accused] was observed speeding, as he 
was driving the vehicle at twice the posted 
speed limit in a residential area.
2. The [accused] was driving an unregistered 
motor vehicle which in turn was an 
uninsured motor vehicle.
3. The [accused] could not provide adequate 
identification because he had no driver’s 
licence, no registration, no insurance or any 
other identification although he was 
observed rummaging in the vehicle prior to 
his arrest.
Either the speeding or the driving of the 
unregistered vehicle, combined with the 
[accused’s] failure to provide adequate 
identification, satisfy the elements of section 
169 of the Traffic Safety Act permitting an arrest 
without warrant. 
“Reasonable grounds have both a subjective and objective component. An 
arresting officer must subjectively have reasonable grounds to base the arrest. In 
addition, these grounds must be justifiable from an objective point of view. The 
existence of the subjective reasonable grounds must be assessed on the totality of 
facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. The objective 
component is assessed ‘through the eyes of the reasonable person with the 
experience and knowledge of the arresting officer’.”
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In conclusion, based on the factual findings 
made by the trial judge the arresting officer had 
the subjective reasonable grounds to arrest the 
[accused] under the Traffic Safety Act and those 
grounds are justifiable from an objective point 
of view. Thus, the arrest was authorized by law 
and therefore not an arbitrary detention. ... 
[paras. 31-33]
Unreasonable Search or Seizure?
The Court of Appeal found it did not need to decide 
whether or not the  trial judge was correct in finding 
the accused had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle. Even if he had standing to 
bring a s. 8 Charter  claim, the search was 
reasonable as an incident to arrest. Not only was 
the arrest lawful, but the search of the vehicle  was 
truly incident to the accused’s arrest:
In this case, once the [accused] stopped and 
told the officers the car was unregistered and 
he did not have a licence, the police began to 
investigate him for driving an unregistered and 
uninsured vehicle, having no driver’s licence, 
and failing to provide any, let alone adequate, 
identification. Upon the arrest of the [accused], 
the police purpose for the search of the vehicle 
was to look for identification of the [accused] 
as it would be reasonable to expect to find 
identification in the vehicle, as well as any 
information respecting ownership. The shotgun, 
knife and ammunition were found in plain view 
while the police reasonably searched for 
identifying information. Thus, the seizure of the 
shotgun, ammunition and knife was a lawful 
seizure incident to the arrest of the [accused]. 
[para. 41]
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal  concluded the trial judge did 
not err in admitting the evidence, a decision that 
attracted deference as long as the trial judge 
considered the proper factors and did not make any 
unreasonable findings. In this case, the trial judge 
was found to have applied the correct legal tests 
and the proper s. 24(2) factors in his analysis. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
SATISFIED: NO ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Li, 2020 SCC 12
Police received an anonymous 
Crime Stoppers tip involving a 
phone number that the tipster 
alleged belonged to a dial-a-dope 
operation. The tipster also stated that 
the operation involved the sale of cocaine from a 
tan Honda Odyssey minivan and the vehicle’s 
licence plate number was provided. The officer 
taking the tip recorded the information in a 
document, called a “Swan” sheet. Police database 
queries related to the phone number were negative. 
A check of the licence plate number showed it was 
registered to an Odyssey minivan. A PRIME (Police 
R e c o r d s a n d I n f o r m a t i o n M a n a g e m e n t 
Environment) query revealed the registered owner 
of the licence plate had an extensive history of 
suspected drug trafficking through dial-a-dope 
operations, including several recent reports. Motor 
vehicle records also revealed the registered owner 
had five other vehicles registered in his name. 
When police placed a call to the phone number it 
rang twice, then disconnected. The officer recorded 
on the “Swan” document that he had a reasonable 
suspicion that the phone number was a  dial-a-dope 
drug line.
Police subsequently selected the phone number for 
an attempted undercover drug purchase. An officer 
called the phone number. It was answered by a 
man. The officer asked how the man was doing, 
and he responded that he was “good”. The man 
then asked who was calling, and the officer said it 
was “J” or “Jen”. The man said “Okay”. He did not 
ask any follow up questions, so the officer stated 
that she wanted “half of soft”, a street term for half 
a gram of powder cocaine. The man said that he 
could meet her, and they arranged to meet at a 
supermarket. About half an hour later, they met in 
the parking lot and negotiated a purchase of 0.75 
grams of powder cocaine for $80. Over the 
following months, the police made an additional 
21 drug purchases as part of their investigation. The 
accused was involved in 16 of these transactions.
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British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused pled guilty to one count of 
trafficking in cocaine. However, he 
argued that he was entrapped and the 
proceedings should be stayed. The judge 
agreed. When the officer made her initial phone 
call, the police did not have a reasonable suspicion 
the accused was a drug trafficker or that the phone 
number was affiliated to a dial-a-dope operation. 
“Nothing in the original tip was corroborated or 
linked by external police investigation,” said the 
judge. “While the police may have had a mere 
suspicion, this is not sufficient. The police  did not 
corroborate the original tip either connecting [the 
accused] personally  with the vehicle or telephone 
number in the Crime Stopper tip, or connecting 
the phone number and vehicle or registered 
owner of that vehicle. The tip contained no other 
information to corroborate such as names, 
descriptions, or accents.”
Further, “the police did not achieve an objectively 
reasonable suspicion through investigative steps 
after calling the phone number and giving the 
opportunity to commit the offence,” said the 
judge. When the officer called the phone number, 
she engaged the accused in a criminal transaction 
for cocaine without taking investigative steps or 
gaining additional information.“[The officer’s] 
request for a half of soft was not an investigative 
step at an opportunity  to traffic. It was a request 
for a particular type and amount of drugs. She 
engaged in transactional language that only 
required [the accused] to say yes for the offence 
to be complete. She offered him an opportunity to 
traffic by offer without reasonable  suspicion.”  As 
a consequence, a stay of proceedings was entered.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown challenged the trial 
judge’s ruling on entrapment. The 
Court of Appeal first reviewed 
the rules of  entrapment. It noted 
that entrapment can occur in the following ways:
1.  the  authorities provide an opportunity to a 
person to commit an offence:
 
• without a reasonable suspicion the person is 
already engaged in the particular criminal 
activity; or 
• the po l ice under take a bona f ide 
investigation directed at an area  where it is 
reasonably suspected that criminal activity is 
occurring. 
2.  with a reasonable suspicion but they go beyond 
simply  providing an opportunity and induce 
the commission of an offence.
Reasonable Suspicion
Justice Grobermen, speaking for the Court of 
Appeal, concluded that the trial judge failed to 
consider the tip as a whole rather than separating 
the information into parts. There  was no need for 
the tip to identify the accused personally by name 
nor were the police required to establish, 
independently  of the tip itself, that the telephone 
number belonged to a dial-a-dope operation. 
Rather, it was only necessary that the police 
establish a reasonable suspicion that the number 
called was one dedicated to drug trafficking 
through a dial-a-dope operation given the details of 
the Crime Stoppers tip and the preliminary 
information uncovered in police investigations:
While the Crime Stoppers tip was from an 
anonymous informant of unknown reliability, 
aspects of the tip enhanced its credibility. The 
tip referred to a vehicle that the police were 
able to connect to a person who appears to 
have been involved in several dial-a-dope 
operations. The police were entitled, in the 
circumstances, to attach considerable weight 
to the tip. [para. 18]
In summary, the judge erred in requiring 
specific corroboration of all elements of the 
tip. Such corroboration was unnecessary. 
Rather, what was required was that the police 
had sufficient information to harbour a 
reasonable suspicion that they were calling a 
phone number attached to a drug trafficking 
operation. [para. 24]
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The police officers also operated as a team, rather 
than as separate  individuals, and the officer making 
the telephone call was entitled to take action based 
on the advice of her colleagues.
The Appeal Court noted that “the reasonable 
suspicion standard is not an onerous one.”  It is 
something more than a mere suspicion but less 
than reasonable and probable grounds. In some 
cases, the standard will not have been met where 
the police have acted on anonymous tips of 
indeterminate credibility and no attempt had been 
made to investigate. In other cases, “very limited 
confirmatory evidence has been held to be 
sufficient to transform an anonymous tip (or a  tip 
of uncertain credibility) into ‘reasonable 
suspicion’.”  In this case, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the  reasonable suspicion standard 
had been satisfied:
[S]ome details of the tip were confirmed: the 
correspondence between the licence plate 
number and the Honda Odyssey, and the 
apparent involvement of the vehicle’s owner 
with dial-a-dope operations. Those elements of 
confirmation were sufficient to give the police 
reasonable suspicion that the number they 
called was associated with a dial-a-dope 
operation. [para. 32]
Thus, the police had a  reasonable suspicion before 
providing the accused with the opportunity to sell 
cocaine to an undercover officer.
A Bona Fide Investigation?
The police were also involved in a bone fide 
investigation in which they could approach a 
person and attempt to purchase drugs. Here, the 
police were undertaking a bona fide investigation 
where  it was reasonably suspected that criminal 
activi ty was occurring. “The police had 
information that was sufficient to label the 
telephone number ‘suspicious’,”  said Justice 
Groberman. “The limited inquiries made by [the 
police  officer] can properly be characterized as 
investigative in nature. The actual transaction to 
purchase the drug occurred later, and only after 
negotiations at the [supermarket].”
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the stay of 
proceedings lifted, and the matter was remitted 
back to the trial court for sentencing. 
Supreme Court of Canada
In a  short oral judgement, the 
nine-member unanimous 
panel of the Supreme Court of 
Canada dismissed a further 
appeal by the accused. Justice 
Martin stated:
We recognize that neither level of court in this 
appeal had the benefit of this Court’s reasons in 
R. v. Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11. As explained in 
Ahmad, when investigating a suspected dial-a-
dope operation, the police must have 
reasonable suspicion over the individual or 
over the phone number or over a combination 
of both, before they can ask to purchase drugs 
from the person answering the phone. 
Applying this framework and considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the police had 
reasonable suspicion, before making the call, 
that the phone number was being used for drug 
dealing. The police used a Swan sheet to record 
what actions they took to verify this tip. The tip 
was that a specific phone number was being 
used in a dial-a-dope operation to sell cocaine, 
the sales took place near a particular mall, and 
involved a tan Honda Odyssey with a specific 
licence plate. In addition to the phone number, 
the tip provided details such as which drug was 
for sale, the area of operation, a vehicle 
description, and licence plate number.  The 
“[W]hen investigating a suspected dial-a-dope operation, the police must have 
reasonable suspicion over the individual or over the phone number or over a 
combination of both, before they can ask to purchase drugs from the person 
answering the phone.” 
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police confirmed the assertion of illegality by 
connecting this car and licence plate, and five 
other vehicles, to a person with an extensive 
and recent history of suspected dial-a-dope 
drug dealings.
Finding no entrapment, a verdict of guilty  was 
entered and the matter was remitted for sentencing.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details obtained from R. 
v. Li, 2019 BCCA 344. For a summary of R. v. 
Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11 see “In-Service: 10-8” 
Volume 20 Issue 3.
NO REQUIREMENT TO REFRAIN 
FROM ELICITING EVIDENCE 
DUE TO LACK OF DILIGENCE 
R. v. Catellier, 2020 QCCA 850
 
While investigating the attack on a 
man in his home, the  accused was 
arrested at 10:45 am by an officer. 
He was advised of his right to 
counsel and given the official 
warning. The accused did not express a desire to 
contact a lawyer. He was transported to the police 
station where he requested to speak to counsel of 
choice at 11:40 a.m. At 11:42 a.m., a  police officer 
called the accused’s counsel of choice but there 
was no answer. The officer left a message  and told 
the accused he did so. The accused was placed in a 
cell. At 1:40 p.m., the investigator went to the 
accused’s cell and led him to an interview room. 
She explained the reason for his arrest and made 
sure he understood. At 1:41 p.m., she again read 
him his rights. The accused told the investigator that 
he had already asked to speak to counsel of choice. 
The investigator then learned from a colleague that 
the lawyer of choice had still not called back.
The investigator, in her own words, offered the 
accused an opportunity to contact another lawyer 
or duty  counsel. The accused stated that he 
understood this offer, but he refused it and insisted 
on speaking with his lawyer of choice. The 
investigator warned the accused he need not say 
anything and whatever he did say would be used as 
evidence against him. The investigator then 
interviewed the accused and he provided an 
incriminating statement. He was charged with 
break and enter, and assault with a weapon.
Court of Quebec
The judge concluded, among other 
things, that the police did not breach the 
accused’s s. 10(b) Charter right to 
counsel. The judge found the police had 
respected the duties imposed under the 
implementational component of s. 10(b): (1) the 
duty  to provide the accused with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his right to counsel and (2) 
the duty to refrain from eliciting evidence until he 
had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. 
These  duties were  first triggered at 11:40 a.m. when 
the accused asked to speak to his counsel of 
choice. During the two hour period from 11:40 
a.m. to 1:40 p.m., the  accused had not acted 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Prosper Warning
The “Prosper Warning” is named after a Supreme 
Court of Canada case R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 
and was described in R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37.as 
follows:
[W]hen a detainee, diligent but unsuccessful in contacting 
counsel, changes his or her mind and decides not to pursue 
contact with a lawyer,  s. 10(b) mandates that 
the police explicitly inform the detainee of his or her right 
to a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and of 
the police obligation to hold off in their questioning until 
then. This additional informational obligation, referred to 
in this appeal as the duty to give a “Prosper warning”, is 
warranted in such circumstances so as to ensure that a 
detainee is informed that their unsuccessful attempts to 
reach counsel did not exhaust the s. 10(b) right, to ensure 
that any choice to speak with the  police  does not derive 
from such a misconception, and to ensure that a decision 
to waive the right to counsel is fully informed. [ para. 32]
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





      

      




        
       



    

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diligently. He refused to speak to other counsel. 
Furthermore, the  judge concluded that a Prosper 
warning was not necessary since the accused had 
not acted diligently by refusing to consult counsel 
other than his counsel of choice. The accused’s 
statement was admitted and he was convicted of 
breaking and entering a  dwelling house and 
committing an assault, and assault while carrying a 
weapon. He was sentenced to 47 months.
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in holding that the 
police did not breach his s. 10(b) 
right to counsel. In his view, his 
incriminating statement ought to have been 
excluded as evidence under s. 24(2).
Right to Counsel
Justice Healy, speaking for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found the trial judge did not err in his s. 
10(b) analysis. First, there was no breach of the 
implementational component:
In these circumstances, the judge correctly 
concluded that the two-hour waiting period 
was reasonable and that, accordingly, by 
refusing to speak with other counsel, the 
[accused] had not acted diligently. The reasons 
for her decision reveal that she undertook a 
contextual review, taking into account all of the 
relevant factors. The reasonableness of the 
period of time and the diligence of an accused 
are highly factual and depend on the 
circumstances as a whole. The trial judge 
correctly applied the applicable rules of law 
and held that, with respect to the facts before 
her, the opportunity provided to the [accused] 
was reasonable. There is no reason to interfere 
with this conclusion. Given the [accused’s] 
categorical refusal at 1:42 p.m., which amounts 
to an explicit waiver of the right to retain 
counsel without delay,  [the investigating 
officer] was no longer under a duty to refrain 
from eliciting evidence from him. [references 
omitted, para. 17]
Prosper Warning?
Sometimes the  police  are obligated to provide an 
arrestee with additional informational. In this case, 
the Court of Appeal found this additional 
information was provided by the investigator  at 
1:41 p.m. “Her words corresponded perfectly with 
the additional informational obligation”  said 
Justice Healy:
The [accused] was informed that he could 
consult with counsel other than [his counsel of 
choice]. The notice, given by  [the investigator] 
at approximately 1:41  p.m., was in substance 
the equivalent of a  Prosper  warning,  and the 
judge concluded that the [accused] understood 
its meaning. This factual finding does not 
warrant the intervention of this Court. 
Ultimately, whether or not the [accused] could 
have been more diligent in the exercise of his 
r i g h t t o c o u n s e l m a t t e r s l i t t l e . 
The  police  officers fulfilled all of their 
obligations, both the informational obligation 
and the implementational duty. [para. 21]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Catellier, 2018 QCCQ 4121.
POLICE ACTED ON MORE THAN 
INSTINCT: DETENTION & PAT-
DOWN LAWFUL
R. v. Wolfson, 2020 QCCA 856
Just after midnight police officers 
entered a  Montreal strip club. They 
saw three men, two of whom were 
already known to them. An officer 
saw one of the men attempting to 
conceal a satchel.  The officer grabbed it and 
discovered a firearm inside. Once back-up arrived, 
the police arrested the three men. 
While the men were escorted outside the club, an 
officer noticed an interaction between one of the 
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men and the accused who was seated near the 
exit. The police suspected the accused was acting 
as a “watchman” for the  arrested men. This 
suspicion was based on the accused’s clothing, his 
position in the bar and his actions. The police 
shone a flashlight at him and he then rushed 
towards the bar. But an officer held him back by 
grabbing the sleeve of his coat.
The accused was escorted into a hallway leading to 
the exit. Once there, the accused said he wanted to 
speak with his lawyer. The  police explained to him 
that he could exercise his right to counsel after 
being searched. He was then informed that he was 
being held for investigation and was suspected of 
being armed. Given his lack of cooperation, he was 
handcuffed. A pat-down search led to the discovery 
of a motel room key, a  gun magazine  and a  .40-
caliber Glock 22 pistol. The accused was arrested 
for illegal possession of a firearm.
A ballistic expert subsequently confirmed that the 
firearm found as a result of the  pat-down was used 
in a murder and an attempted murder.  This 
evidence formed part of the case against the 
accused on charges of murder, attempted murder 
and possessing a loaded restricted firearm.
Quebec Superior Court
The judge ruled the pol ice had 
reasonable suspicion to detain the 
accused. The police were acting on more 
than intuition or instinct. The actions of 
the accused and his clothing drew the attention of 
the police, leading them to believe that he was a 
“watchman” for the  men who had just been 
arrested.
The incidental search was also reasonable. The 
discovery of a  gun magazine during the non-
intrusive pat-down search allowed the police to 
continue their search for a gun, which was found 
concealed in the back of the the accused’s pants 
and was not initially  visible, given the coat he was 
wearing.
The judge concluded the accused’s ss. 8 or 9 
Charter rights had not been breached. Moreover, 
even if the accused’s rights had been violated, the 
judge would have admitted the evidence in any 
event. The gun was admissible and the accused was 
convicted.
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the  trial judge 
erred in dismissing his motion to 
exc lude t he  f i r ea rm and 
magazine. He claimed the police had no 
reasonable suspicion allowing them to detain him 
for investigation and there  was no threat to the 
safety of the officers authorizing them to conduct a 
search. Thus, he suggested his s. 8 Charter rights 
were breached. 
Investigative Detention
The  police  have the  power to detain for 
investigative purposes provided the detention was 
carried out within the limits established by the 
common law. In doing so, the police must have 
reasonable grounds to suspect, in light of all the 
circumstances, that that person is involved in a 
particular crime and that it is necessary to 
detain. “Reasonable grounds to suspect” is a  lower 
standard than “reasonable grounds to believe” 
since it refers to the possibility and not the 
likelihood of a crime. Further, reasonable suspicion 
cannot be justified by a mere subjective belief. 
Reasonable suspicion must be based on objectively 
discernible facts and analyzed on the totality of 
circumstances.  It takes more than general 
suspicions or suspicions only related to a particular 
place or activity for the threshold to be crossed. 
In this case, the trial judge undertook a detailed 
analysis of the circumstances surrounding the 
accused’s detention. The judge found the police did 
not act by  intuition or instinct, but rather acted on 
the basis of objectively observable facts which 
included: the interaction between the accused and 
one of the three men arrested for possessing a gun; 
the positioning of the accused at the time of the 
arrest of the three men; the wearing of a  mid-length 
coat in an overheated place; the absence of 
consumption; his attitude during the arrest of the 
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three  men; his flight when he was targeted by a 
flashlight; and his reaction when he was stopped by 
the police.  These factors were specific enough to 
provide police with reasonable grounds to suspect 
thim of criminal activity. The circumstances, as a 
whole, objectively indicated the possibility, if not 
the likelihood, of criminal behavior.  The police 
acted within the powers conferred on them by 
the common law and the accused’s detention was 
lawful.
The accused’s s. 10 Charter rights were also 
respected during the brief period of detention. The 
police told the accused of the reason for his 
detention in accordance with s. 10(a). They 
explained he could exercise his right to counsel 
under s. 10(b) once the safety search was 
completed. Although the accused did not exercise 
his right to counsel “without delay”, this was 
justified by the imminent security  threat that existed 
at the time of detention. In these circumstances, the 
preventive  pat-down search had to be carried out 
quickly to defuse the risk of danger.
Protective Search
Under the common law there is a  limited power to 
search incidental to an investigative detention.  A 
police officer who has reasonable grounds to 
believe that their safety or that of others is 
threatened may conduct a preventive pat-down 
search. This power is justified by the police duty  to 
protect life  and safety. However, vague or non-
existent concerns can not justify a search, nor can 
the police proceed solely on the basis of an instinct 
or intuition. Rather, the police must act on known 
facts and reasonable inferences related to the 
situation. The search must also be conducted in a 
reasonable manner. A search will be deemed 
reasonable if the way it was executed was 
reasonably necessary to eliminate the looming 
security threat to police or others.
Here, the police  had reasonable grounds to believe 
that their safety, or that of others, was at risk. The 
police had just observed an interaction between the 
accused and one of the men who had just been 
found in possession of a firearm. The accused was 
suspected of acting as a “watchman” for the trio 
and was being detained for this reason.  His 
reaction to detention, including his body language 
and nervousness, gave the police reasonable 
grounds to believe that he was armed, an imminent 
threat that needed to be defused. As a result, the 
police could lawfully carry out a security search.
Handcuffing
The Court of Appeal also concluded the force used, 
both during the detention and during the search, 
was reasonable.  The use of handcuffs was 
reasonably justified in the circumstances.  The 
police testified that the accused was not 
cooperative and that they feared for their safety. The 
manner of search was reasonably necessary to 
eliminate the security threat.
Since there were no ss. 8 or 9 Charter violations, it 
was not necessary  to consider the accused’s request 
for exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2). 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ARRESTEE DID NOT EXHAUST 
s. 10(b) RIGHT WITH INITIAL 
CONSULTATION
R. v. Dussault, 2020 QCCA 746
At 2:10 p.m. the accused was 
arrested for murder and arson. He 
was promptly advised of his right to 
counsel and of the right to silence. At 
2:27 p.m. he requested to speak with 
a lawyer. At 2:36 p.m. the accused arrived at the 
police station and at 2:45 p.m. he was shown a list 
of lawyers. From this list he chose to speak with a 
lawyer whom he did not know. A police  officer 
telephoned the lawyer at 2:47 p.m. and informed 
the lawyer that the accused had been arrested for 
murder, arson and possessing drugs. The lawyer 
told the officer that, in view of the charges, he 
would come to the  police station to consult with 
the accused.
At 2:51 p.m., the accused spoke to the lawyer in 
private on the phone. At 3:00 p.m. the accused 
knocked on the door and informed an officer that 
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the lawyer wished to speak with him. The officer 
spoke to the lawyer for about three minutes. During 
this exchange the lawyer told the officer that, in 
light of the seriousness of the offences, he wished 
to see the  accused in person. The officer then 
returned the telephone to the accused so the lawyer 
could speak again with him. This conversation 
ended at 3:04 p.m. and the accused was returned 
to his cell.
Despite the lawyer's assertion that he would come 
to the station, the police  decided the accused had 
already exercised his right to counsel. He had 
spoken to his lawyer by phone and the  lawyer 
would not be permitted to further consult with the 
accused at the police station. When the officer in 
charge of cells received a telephone call from the 
lawyer that he would be arriving shortly, the  lawyer 
objected when told no such meeting would occur 
and said he would nevertheless come to the police 
station. When he arrived at the police station, the 
lawyer was advised a second time that he could not 
meet with the accused and he was directed to wait.
The investigators then consulted with a Crown 
prosecutor who, after some research, advised 
police that that in her opinion the  accused had 
already exercised his right to counsel when he 
spoke by telephone with his lawyer. The prosecutor 
said that she could not direct the police how to 
proceed but, in her view, they were not obliged to 
allow the accused a further opportunity to consult 
with his lawyer before he was questioned. She 
added that the lawyer was not entitled to be present 
at the interrogation.
The investigators decided not to permit further 
consultation between the accused and his lawyer 
before proceeding with questioning. Meanwhile, 
when he asked three times whether his lawyer had 
arrived at the station, the police  declined to tell the 
accused that his lawyer was at the station or that 
his lawyer had asked to speak with him. At 8:52 
p.m. the accused was taken for an interview. He 
continued to express his expectation that his lawyer 
would come to the station and he was reluctant to 
proceed with the interview. The interviewer 
persisted despite the  accused’s repeated assertions 
that he did not wish to say anything further and that 
he wanted the interview to stop. The accused 
subsequently provided an incriminating statement.
Superior Court of Quebec
The judge concluded that the  accused 
had exercised his right to counsel by the 
end of the telephone call with his lawyer. 
The judge found the police had 
discharged the implementation duties imposed 
upon them by s. 10(b) of the Charter and, 
accordingly, the statement obtained from the 
accused was not obtained unconstitutionally. The 
accused was convicted of second-degree murder. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused claimed that the 
police violated his right to 
counsel by refusing to allow him 
to continue his consultation with 
counsel at the police station and proceeded to 
interrogate him. He submitted that his consultation 
was not complete because it was interrupted when 
his lawyer informed him that he would come meet 
him at the police station. The telephone call with 
his lawyer did not fulfil or exhaust his right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. In his view, the 
police should have allowed him to consult with his 
lawyer upon the lawyer’s arrival at the station. The 
refusal of police to allow him to continue 
consulting was a violation of the  implementational 
duty  under s.10(b) and his incriminating statement 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2). He 
claimed that his consultation with his lawyer was 
not complete because it was interrupted when he 
was informed that his lawyer would come to the 
police station. Accordingly, the accused suggested 
that the implementational duties on the  police 
continued and required them to refrain from 
questioning him until after he completed his 
consultation with counsel at the police station.
The Crown, on the other hand, asserted that the 
police fully respected the accused’s right to counsel 
and his right to silence. The accused confirmed he 
understood his rights and exercised his right to 
counsel. In the Crown’s opinion, the police had 
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fulfilled their constitutional obligations and were 
justified when they refused to allow the  lawyer 
access to the accused for a second time.
Right to Counsel
Generally, s. 10(b) affords a detainee with a single 
consultation with a lawyer because the right to 
counsel is not absolute and continuous. However, 
i n s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a d d i t i o n a l 
implementational duties are  triggered on police to 
permit a  detainee a further opportunity to consult a 
lawyer. Such circumstances include when there is 
an objectively observable  change in circumstances, 
when new developments arise, or when there is an 
indication that a detainee who has waived his right 
to counsel may not have understood his right. 
Here, the police did not want to give  the accused 
an opportunity to speak with his lawyer after the 
telephone conversation but before proceeding with 
an interview. They deliberately took measures, 
including misrepresentations to the accused, to 
prevent the continued consultation with counsel. 
They not only refused to allow the lawyer access to 
the accused so the consultation could continue but 
they concealed from the accused that the lawyer 
had come to the station.
Justice Healy, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
concluded that the accused’s consultation by 
telephone with his lawyer did not exhaust the right 
under s. 10(b) because the  consultation he was 
entitled to was incomplete. The implementation 
duties under s. 10(b) obliged the police in this case 
to allow a continuation of the consultation. The 
police should have refrained from interrogating the 
accused until he had spoken with his lawyer at the 
police station. 
Moreover, the accused had been diligent in 
asserting his right to counsel. Apart from the 
lawyer’s request that the police refrain from 
questioning him until after he  met the accused at 
the police station, the evidence demonstrated that 
the accused expected to meet the lawyer at the 
station to continue the consultation that began on 
the telephone. But the police deliberately  frustrated 
this consultation. They told the lawyer twice that he 
could not see the accused. The accused had also 
asked whether his lawyer had arrived at the station 
but was told that the lawyer was not, when in fact 
he was present.
Since the consultation with his lawyer was 
incomplete, the accused’s right to counsel was not 
exhausted and the implementational duties 
imposed on the police continued until the accused 
could consult with counsel at the police station. 
Although a lawyer cannot assert the right to 
counsel on an accused’s behalf — the right belongs 
to the  accused — the police  took the  narrowest and 
restrictive view of the  scope of the  right to counsel 
to obtain strategic advantage, rather than a 
purposive interpretation. Otherwise, as an example, 
the right to counsel would be exhausted if an 
arrestee reached counsel by telephone and the 
lawyer said no more than they would come to the 
police station to advise the arrestee more fully. 
The s. 10(b) right requires investigators to facilitate 
the effective assistance of counsel. In this case, the 
effective assistance of counsel was denied when 
investigators determined not to permit a 
continuation of the consultation that began on the 
telephone. Not permitting the consultation to 
continue at the police station was inconsistent with 
the implementation duties under s. 10(b). The 
police prevented a  consultation that had begun on 
the telephone but had not been completed. The 
implementation duty imposed on the police 
required them to allow the initial telephone 
consultation on the  telephone to continue to its 
completion at the police station. And there was no 
urgency to override this consideration.
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal excluded the  accused’s 
incriminating statement under s. 24(2). In its view, 
the admission of the statement would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.  
 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction 
was quashed and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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PENILE SWAB EVIDENCE 
ADMITTED DESPITE CHARTER 
BREACH
R. v. Cortes Rivera, 2020 ABCA 76
 
Following the report of a sexual 
a s s a u l t i n v o l v i n g p e n i l e 
penetration ,the accused was 
arrested by police and, through a 
Spanish translator, was advised of his 
right to counsel. He spoke a lawyer at the police 
station and was placed in a dry cell. He was strip 
searched and, while naked, a penile swab was 
taken (about 10 hours after the  alleged assault). The 
swab procedure was conducted by one police 
officer in the presence of two other officers.
     
The accused was not offered the opportunity to 
perform the  penile swab himself nor was an 
interpreter present during this procedure. He 
declined later opportunities to speak further with a 
lawyer. After the taking of the swab, the accused 
provided a statement to the police through an 
interpreter. He was charged with sexual assault.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
At trial an expert testified that DNA 
consistent with the victim was found on 
the penile  swab taken from the accused. 
The judge, among other holdings, found 
the police conducted the penile swab as an 
incident to arrest. The police had reasonable 
grounds to believe that a penile swab would afford 
evidence of the offence for which the accused was 
lawfully arrested. The swab was taken 10 hours 
after the alleged assault and any suggestion that the 
victim’s DNA believed to be in the accused’s 
genital region would be destroyed was mere 
speculation. 
As for the  process of taking the  swab itself, the 
judge noted it was: authorized by a  supervisor; 
conducted at the police station in a  private  area by 
a trained officer who wore gloves and used a sterile 
cotton swab; and the purpose, process, and legal 
authority were explained to the accused. Moreover, 
the officers present were of the same gender as the 
accused and both the strip search and penile swab 
were conducted as quickly as possible — the swab 
took only 15 seconds or less to complete. The judge 
opined that the failure to offer the accused the 
opportunity to take the swab himself was 
reasonable given the “language barrier” and the 
female interpreter was not present when the 
swabbing occurred. 
But the judge found three separate s. 8 Charter 
breaches in relation to the taking of the  penile 
swab: 
1. the unnecessary presence of a third officer 
during the taking of the swab; 
2. the accused was left fully naked during the 
taking of the swab; and 
3. the police failed to make a  complete record of 
the process they followed.
On these points, the judge stated:
The Accused removed his own clothing. [The 
Detective] was able to provide evidence on the 
reasons for and manner in which the strip 
search and swab were conducted. However, he 
did not recall some details, including whether 
the Accused was completely naked during the 
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penile swab. [The Detective’s] notes also did 
not include the state of dress of the Accused 
during the swab. There was differing evidence 
on this point. [The Detective’s] recollection was 
that the Accused kept his shirt on. [The 
swabbing officer’s] evidence was that because 
the strip search and the penile swab were being 
done at the same time, the Accused was 
entirely naked when the swab was done. As the 
guidelines address the state of dress of the 
Accused, it is an important detail and a proper 
record should include this information. It 
appears from the evidence that the Accused 
was completely undressed at one point during 
the combined process, contrary to the 
guidelines in both Golden and Saeed.
Further, three officers were present during the 
taking of the swab. Again, [the Detective] was 
taking notes of and overseeing the search 
process. [The swabbing officer] was conducting 
the search and swab. [The swabbing officer] 
requested that [a third officer] be present during 
the search for his safety. The Accused had by 
then been frisk searched and was being 
cooperative. [The detective] confirmed that 
having a third officer present may have been 
unnecessary. His experience since that day has 
been that there are usually only two officers 
present during a penal swab. Thus, the 
guideline in Saeed was exceeded by one 
officer. [R. v. Cortes Rivera, 2017 ABQB 275, 
paras. 121-122]
Despite these aspects not complying with the 
guidelines set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the judge nevertheless admitted the results of the 
swab as evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. The 
accused was convicted of sexual assault. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
trial judge erred in admitting the 
results of the penile swab into 
evidence despite  having found a 
s. 8 Charter  breach in relation to the circumstances 
in which the penile swab was taken. But the Court 
of Appeal disagreed. Of note, the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in R. v. Saeed, 2016 SCC 24, 
which outlined the proper protocol to be followed 
in taking penile swabs, had not yet been delivered 
at the time the swab was taken from the accused. A 
majority wrote:
Prior to the receipt of Saeed the retrieving of a 
penile swab was typically undertaken 
incidental to arrest, such as occurred here. 
Some degree of privacy was maintained in this 
case as the swab was taken in a cell, albeit in 
the presence f more police officers than 
necessary for the task. [The Detective] testified 
he forgot to audio record the taking of the swab 
as it was his first one; there is no suggestion of 
malice or improper purpose in the failure to 
create a more complete record. [The accused’s] 
trial counsel did not raise the reasonableness of 
the strip search that led to him being naked 
when the swab was taken. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the trial judge did not address it 
as a concern in her decision. The analysis by 
her of these Charter breaches was reasonable in 
the circumstances at the time.
While it would have undoubtedly been 
preferable for a male interpreter to have been 
located who could have been present during 
the swabbing process, that would have added 
another set of eyes to the intrusion on [the 
accused’s] privacy, and the process to conduct 
the swabbing was explained in advance to him 
through the interpreter.
The trial judge concluded that given the brief 
duration and manner of the swab, the breach 
was not serious and did not have a significant 
impact on [the accused’s] interests, with the 
result that the truth-seeking function was better 
served by admission of this evidence. [paras. 
50-52]
The trial judge’s determination under s. 24(2) was 
owed deference and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. Justice Slatter in a separate opinion, 
although dissenting in part, agreed with the 
majority on the admission of the penile swab. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Cortes Rivera, 2017 ABQB 275. 
Volume 20 Issue 4 ~ July/August 2020
PAGE 19
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Penile Swabs
In R. v. Saeed, 2016 SCC 24, the Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld the taking of a 
penile swab from a sexual assault 
arrestee for the purpose of collecting 
the victim DNA. In doing so, the Court outlined the 
following:
1. The arrest itself must be lawful.
2.  The swab must be truly incident to the arrest, in 
the sense that the swab must be related to the 
reasons for the arrest, and it must be performed 
for a valid purpose. The valid purpose will generally 
be to preserve or discover evidence.  
3. In addition to the reasonable grounds for arrest, 
the police must also have independent reasonable 
grounds to believe that a penile swab will afford 
evidence of the offence for which the accused was 
arrested. Whether reasonable grounds have been 
established will vary with the facts of each case. 
Relevant factors include the timing of the arrest in 
relation to the alleged offence, the nature of the 
allegations, and whether there is evidence that the 
substance being sought has already been 
destroyed. 
4. The penile swab must also be conducted in a 
reasonable manner. 
A number of factors were provided to guide police in 
reasonably conducting penile swabs incident to 
arrest: 
• The penile swab should, as a general rule, be 
conducted at the police  station. 
• The swab should be conducted in a manner that 
ensures the health and safety of all involved. 
• The swab should be authorized by a police officer 
acting in a supervisory capacity. 
• The accused should be informed shortly before the 
swab of the nature of the procedure for taking the 
swab, the purpose of taking the swab, and the 
authority of the police to require the swab. 
• The accused should be given the option of removing 
his clothing and taking the swab himself, and if he 
does not choose this option, the swab should be 
taken or directed by a trained officer or medical 
professional, with the minimum of force necessary. 
• The police officer(s) carrying out the penile swab 
should be of the same gender as the individual 
being swabbed, unless the circumstances compel 
otherwise. 
• There should be no more police officers involved in 
the swab than are reasonably necessary in the 
circumstances. 
• The swab should be carried out in a private area 
such that no one other than the individuals 
engaged in the swab can observe it. 
• The swab should be conducted as quickly as possible 
and in a way that ensures that the person is not 
completely undressed at any one time; and 
• A proper record should be kept of the reasons for 
and the manner in which the swabbing was 
conducted.





   
    
  

   




 
 


       



 
 

        

 
 
 
 


         

 
 

    

        

 
 
        


 
 
 
 



   
      

 


        

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EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE:
PRODUCTION ORDER ISSUED 
ON WRONG LEGAL STANDARD
R. v. West, 2020 ONCA 473
An instant messaging application for 
mobile devices (Kik) detected an 
uploaded image of child pornography 
as a profile picture for one of its 
accounts with the user name 
“mikeandvikes”. This upload was reported to the 
National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre, 
which notified the police. Kik’s report included 
information about when the image was uploaded, 
the account’s username, the type of device used for 
the upload — a Samsung Model SM-T530NU — 
and the Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses 
associated to it. The report also included 
disclaimers stating that the  information it contained 
had not been verified by Kik.
The police determined that both IP addresses 
belonged to Cogeco Cable and were leased to 
users in Hamilton. The police sent a  preservation 
demand to Cogeco, requesting that it preserve any 
subscriber information associated with the two IP 
addresses. Cogeco agreed to do so for one IP 
address but the other one was no longer on file.
A police officer drafted an Information to Obtain 
(ITO) for a  general production order under s. 
487.014 of the Criminal Code. The affidavit 
appended to the ITO stated “the information set 
out herein constitutes the grounds to suspect” that 
the offences of distributing and possessing child 
pornography, contrary to ss. 163.1(3) and 163.1(4) 
of the  Criminal Code, had been committed. Cogeco 
provided the subscriber information associated with 
the second IP address to police which revealed the 
subscriber was the accused. Using this information, 
the police sought a search warrant for the accused’s 
home to find electronic  devices, stored data 
capable of being read by a computer, photographic 
film, digital images, video, computer files or 
documents associated with the accused or the 
“mikeandvikes” account, and any cellular 
telephones capable of accessing the Internet or 
storing images or video. 
When the warrant was executed, the police seized 
digital devices and media, including a total of 
19,687 files containing child pornography, and 
information showing that the accused was the 
owner of the “mikeandvikes” Kik account. Of the 
files located, 10,804 were unique  (i.e., not 
duplicates of other files). These files were found on 
five different devices: two laptop computers, two 
cell phones, and a USB drive. The accused was 
subsequently arrested and charged with possessing, 
distributing and accessing child pornography.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued his rights under s. 8 
of the Charter  had been infringed. In his 
view, there were insufficient grounds to 
obtain either the production order or the 
search warrant. He wanted all of the evidence 
excluded under s. 24(2). 
The judge, however, found no s. 8 breach. The 
judge found the information provided by Kik was 
“probably accurate” and that the  search warrant 
ITO was comprehensive, reliable, reasonable, and 
sufficient to permit the issuance of the warrant. He 
also found that “sufficient information was 
presented to establish a reasonable suspicion 
permitting the issuance of the production order”. 
The accused was convicted of accessing, 
possessing and distributing child pornography. He 
was sentenced to three years’ in prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction again contending his 
rights under s. 8 of the Charter 
were infringed and the evidence 
against him should have been excluded under s. 
24(2). He suggested, in part, that both the 
production order and the search warrant were not 
validly issued.
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Production Order
The accused asserted that the production order was 
issued on the basis of the wrong legal test. Section 
487.014 of the Criminal Code  provides the that a 
production order can be issued on the basis of 
“reasonable grounds to believe”. In this case, 
however, the officer swore in the affidavit to obtain 
the production order that “the information set out 
herein constitutes the grounds to suspect”.  Justice 
Tulloch, speaking  for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, stated:
[The officer] misstated the standard another 
four times throughout his affidavit. He never 
asserted that he had evidence to satisfy the 
actual standard for the issuance of the 
production order – reasonable grounds to 
believe. Despite this clear flaw, the issuing 
justice authorized the production order.
The error was also missed by the trial judge. In 
fact, the trial judge’s conclusion for upholding 
the production order tracked the wording of the 
affiant, asserting that the ITO presented 
sufficient information to “establish a reasonable 
suspicion permitting the issuance of the 
production order.” Beyond this clear error, the 
trial judge’s reasons were also otherwise 
inadequate, as they provided no substantive 
analysis. The trial judge thus failed to properly 
carry out his role of determining whether the 
issuing justice could have concluded that the 
statutory threshold was met. [references 
omitted, paras. 22-23]
Justice Tulloch then determined that there was no 
basis on which the production order could have 
been issued. “In my view, it was an error for the 
issuing justice to issue the order, given that the 
officer never subjectively asserted that he had the 
grounds necessary to satisfy the statutory 
requirements,” said Justice Tulloch. “There is no 
way to reasonably  read the ITO and come away 
with any conclusion other than that there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence had 
been committed, that the information sought was 
in a person’s control, and that the information 
would afford evidence of the commission of the 
offence. This is insufficient to permit the issuance 
of a production order.”  The production of the 
accused’s subscriber information to police therefore 
amounted to a s. 8 Charter violation.
Search Warrant
Since the production order should not have been 
issued, the information gleaned from it was excised 
from the ITO for the search warrant. Without the 
excised production order information, the search 
warrant ITO fell short:
In reviewing the ITO, it is clear that the warrant 
could not have been issued as, without the 
subscriber records, the police would not have 
been aware that the [accused] was associated 
with the second IP address. Without this 
information, the police would not have been 
able to provide a location for the search or any 
details regarding the specific target. Under 
these circumstances, the statutory requirements 
under s. 487(1) could not have been met, as 
there would be no “building, receptacle or 
place” to search. The search of the [accused’s] 
home and electronic devices was therefore 
unlawful and a violation of the Charter. 
[reference omitted, para. 28] 
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal concluded that the admission 
of the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
First, the Charter-infringing police conduct was 
serious such that a  court should dissociate itself 
from the conduct. “In this case, [the officer] was 
negligent in failing to apply the correct legal 
“[The officer] was negligent in failing to apply the correct legal standard in his 
affidavit. The standard of reasonable grounds to believe, ... the requisite legal 
standard[,] was well established and [the officer] should have been aware of this.”
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standard in his affidavit,” said Justice Tulloch. “The 
standard of reasonable  grounds to believe,... the 
requisite legal standard[,] was well established and 
[the officer] should have been aware of this.” 
Second, the  impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused was serious. The 
police searched areas — the accused’s subscriber 
information, his home and his electronic devices — 
that attracted a heightened expectation of privacy. 
Finally, society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits by admitting the reliable and 
critical evidence did not outweigh the first two 
factors. 
The evidence obtained under both the production 
order and the search warrant was excluded under s. 
24(2) of the Charter, the accused’s appeal was 
allowed and acquittals were entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE MAY INTERVIEW 
WITNESS WITHOUT A 
WARRANT: NO s. 8 CHARTER 
BREACH 
R. v. Molyneaux, 2020 PECA 2             
 
The mother of a young child checked 
the accused’s cell phone while he 
was asleep and looked through his 
messages. The accused had been left 
in charge of the child the previous 
night. In the course of her surreptitious browsing of 
the accused’s cell phone, the mother opened its 
photo gallery and saw a number of pictures of her 
child, without any underwear, focussed on her legs, 
buttocks and vagina. The mother then deleted the 
photos. 
The mother later confronted the accused. He said 
that his phone acted up sometimes, it possibly fell 
out of his pocket, the  camera opened and it must 
have taken random pictures. A few weeks later the 
mother told Child and Family Services (CFS) about 
the photos. CFS passed this information on to 
police, who then interviewed the mother.  The 
accused was subsequently contacted and requested 
to attend the police station for an interview. When 
he arrived, he was arrested and his cellphone was 
seized. He was told he could either sign a consent 
form or the police would obtain a warrant to search 
his phone.  He signed the consent and a forensic 
search of his cellphone revealed the photos as 
described by the mother. The accused was charged 
with possessing and making child pornography.
Prince Edward Island Provincial Court
 
Unfortunately, the Crown failed to tender 
the photos obtained from the forensic 
examination as evidence. The judge 
therefore found it unnecessary  to 
determine the reasonableness of the  police forensic 
examination of the accused’s cell phone. However, 
the judge accepted the  testimony of the mother 
about what she  saw on it. The accused was 
convicted of both possessing and making child 
pornography.
Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal
The accused alleged the police 
conduct in approaching the 
mother and requesting her to 
d isc lose the in format ional 
contents of his cellphone constituted a search 
under s. 8 of the  Charter. Although the mother was 
not acting as an agent of the state when the police 
requested her to speak to them, they were seeking 
information about the contents of his cell phone.  
He argued that contacting  the mother and 
obtaining a statement from her about what she saw 
on the his cellphone was a search because the 
police were looking for the informational contents 
of his cellphone, the  contents of which he had a 
high degree of privacy. In his view, this police 
action amounted to an unreasonable  search and 
the trial judge ought to have excluded the evidence 
under s. 24(2). The Crown, on the other hand, 
suggested that the mother’s evidence  was 
completely independent of any Charter breach.  
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Was There a Search?
Justice Mitchell, on behalf of the  Court of Appeal, 
first described s. 8 as follows:
... An invocation of s.8 involves the following 
process: first, the court must ascertain whether 
there has been a search or seizure and if so, 
whether or not the search or seizure was 
reasonable.  To be reasonable the search must 
be authorized by law and conducted in a 
reasonable manner. If the search or seizure was 
not reasonable, then the court must embark on 
a s.24(2) analysis to determine whether or not 
the evidence obtained as a result of the 
unreasonable search or seizure should be 
excluded. ...  [reference omitted, para. 15]
And further:
Section eight of the Charter is only engaged 
when the claimant has a reasonable privacy 
interest in the object or subject matter of the 
state action and the information to which it 
gives access.   The burden is on the claimant on 
a balance of probabilities to show a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy must be 
assessed in the “totality of the circumstances”.
In considering the totality of the circumstances, 
there are four lines of inquiry;
(1) what is the subject matter of the search;
(2) did the claimant have a direct interest in 
the subject matter;
(3) did the claimant have a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the subject 
matter;
(4) if so, was the claimant’s subjective 
expectation of privacy reasonable.
 
Only if the answer to question four is “yes” will 
the claimant have standing to assert his s.8 
right.
           
The reasonable expectation of privacy is fact-
sensitive and fact-specific.   The specific 
circumstances are crucial.   Nonetheless, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard is 
normative rather than simply descriptive.   That 
is, the facts and circumstances must be 
considered in conjunction with the applicable 
norms.  ... [references omitted, paras. 36-39] 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal rejected the 
accused’s submission that there was a search in 
speaking with the mother. Judicial authorization 
was not required prior to asking her what she knew. 
The police   had a duty to investigate. The mother 
first revealed that she had seen the photographs to 
CFS. CFS then passed the information on to the 
police. The police contacted the mother and asked 
her to come for an interview. There was no 
compulsion. The mother attended the interview and 
told police what she  saw. The actions of the police 
in requesting an interview did not constitute a 
search: 
The very thought that police would require 
judicial authorization before interviewing 
“An invocation of s.8 involves the following process: first, the court must 
ascertain whether there has been a search or seizure and if so, whether or not the 
search or seizure was reasonable. To be reasonable the search must be authorized 
by law and conducted in a reasonable manner.”
“Section eight of the Charter is only engaged when the claimant has a reasonable 
privacy interest in the object or subject matter of the state action and the 
information to which it gives access.  The burden is on the claimant on a balance 
of probabilities to show a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Whether a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be assessed in the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’.”
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witnesses because that witness might provide 
information which could in turn lead to the 
police obtaining personal information is 
counter-intuitive if not absurd.  In drug cases, 
for example, informants are critical. Informants 
provide the police with very personal and 
private information about their targets: where 
they live, details of conversations overheard, 
phone numbers, with whom they associate, 
their habits, their plans, and other very personal 
information.  Police do not obtain prior judicial 
authorization before speaking to informants.  
The Charter protection for individuals arises 
when the police act on the information 
received and conduct a search and seizure. A 
search and seizure requires prior judicial 
authorization, speaking with informants does 
not. ... [para. 35]
And further:
The investigative technique used by the police 
was the usual one; speaking to a potential 
witness.  Having heard from one source, CFS, 
that an individual may be witness to a crime or 
may have information relevant to a crime, the 
police sought to interview her.   It was, in fact, 
their duty to investigate the matter. [The 
mother] was free to speak to the police or to 
remain silent.  Society’s conception of the 
proper relationship between the investigative 
branches of the state and the individual surely 
must allow the police to speak to a witness 
without prior judicial authorization. 
I do not believe that the subject matter of the 
"search" was [the accused’s] cell phone or the 
contents thereof. The police were seeking 
information that might reveal whether or not a 
crime occurred, and if so, whether or not they 
should pursue further investigation.  The subject 
of the search was [the mother’s] memory of 
what she saw the morning of December 31, 
2017. [paras. 43-44]
Had the  officer used the mother’s statement in an 
Information to Obtain and obtained a search 
warrant, there would have been no Charter breach. 
The mother’s statement to the police was 
comple te ly independent o f any Char ter 
breach.  “[The mother], as an individual, was free 
to share what she saw and what she thinks with 
whomsoever she pleases subject only to the laws 
of defamation and hate speech,” said Justice 
Mitchell. “[The accused] has no reasonable 
expectation that [the mother] would keep anything 
she saw private.  This is especially so because it 
involved photographs of her four-year-old 
daughter’s vagina.” He continued:
While [the accused] does have a direct interest 
in the subject matter of his cell phone, he has 
no direct interest in [the mother’s] memory of 
what she saw or in the freedom she has to tell 
whomsoever she pleases.  
[The accused] would not have had a 
reasonable expectation that [the mother] would 
keep private what she saw on his cell phone.  
He, no doubt, had a hope that she would not 
tell anyone but he had no reasonable 
expectation that she would keep it to herself. 
It is clear to me that the subject matter of this 
search was what [the mother] saw and her 
memory thereof.  In my view [the accused] did 
not have a subjective expectation of privacy, 
and if he did it was clearly unreasonable. 
In the facts and circumstances of this case and 
applying a normative approach, I believe that 
the proper relationship between the police and 
the individual permits the police to interview a 
potential witness without prior judicial 
authorization. I conclude that [the accused] did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the subject matter of the police interview.   The 
subject matter of the police interview was what 
[the mother] saw and her recollection of what 
she saw. A person has no reasonable 
expectation that an ex-girlfriend/boyfriend/
spouse would keep private what they saw or 
heard. [paras. 54-57]
Since the accused had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the contents of an interview between a 
witness and the police, s. 8 was not engaged.   The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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Update  
This year’s 2020 Canadian Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial Service will proceed by a virtual 
ceremony this year, which will be live-streamed from Parliament Hill on Sunday, September 27, 2020. 
The service will include a solemn reading of the names of officers who have made the ultimate 
sacrifice. Additional details regarding how to join the ceremony virtually will be provided as soon as 
they become available. 
Canadian Police and
Peace Officers’ 43rd
Annual Memorial Service
September 27, 2020
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
Le 43e service commémoratif
annuel des policiers et des
agents de la paix canadiens
Le 27 septembre 2020
Colline du Parlement
Ottawa (Ontario)
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Click thememorial.ca for more information
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EVIDENCE EXCLUDED FROM 
BREACHES OF WELL 
ESTABLISHED CHARTER RULES 
R. v. Adler, 2020 ONCA 246
Officers patrolling the Canadian 
National Exhibition (CNE) were 
informed by a  woman that she had 
seen a man (later identified as the 
accused) filming up the skirt of a 
young woman using a camera concealed in the 
head of a stuffed owl. As police approached the 
accused, they saw him fumble  with a stuffed owl’s 
head, place  something in his mouth and then 
swallow.
The accused was arrested at 6:40 p.m. and the 
police seized the stuffed owl and three digital 
devices — a video camera, an iPod Touch, and a 
laptop — incident to arrest. The video camera did 
not have a memory card leading police to believe 
that they had seen the accused remove it and 
swallow it.
Ten minutes after his arrest, the accused was 
advised of his right to counsel. He told the arresting 
officer he had the name of a lawyer he wanted to 
call but did not have the phone number. The officer 
responded that he would be  given an opportunity 
to speak  to duty counsel. The accused was taken to 
a police station where he was told by the booking 
officer that he would not be allowed to speak with 
a lawyer until after the police had searched his 
apartment. Police were concerned that evidence at 
his apartment might be destroyed. The accused was 
subjected to a strip search to determine whether he 
had secreted another memory card on his person. 
He was then taken to a dry  cell and placed on a 
bedpan vigil in an effort to recover the swallowed 
memory card.
The police attended the  accused’s apartment 
without a warrant and entered it using the keys 
found on him. Upon entry, the police saw various 
devices in plain view, determined that no one was 
present, and then left to obtain a  telewarrant 
authorizing a night-time entry to search the 
apartment and seize  the devices. But the  police did 
not tell the  justice of the peace that they had 
already entered the apartment. Later that night, the 
police re-entered the apartment under the 
telewarrant and found parts of stuffed animals and 
several devices, including an external hard drive.
At 9:59 p.m., more  than three hours after his arrest, 
the accused was permitted to speak with his lawyer. 
The following morning the accused was brought 
before a justice of the peace for a bail hearing. At 
the bail hearing the Crown requested a three-day 
adjournment of the bail hearing on the grounds that 
“further investigation” was necessary. But the police 
did not inform the Crown, who could then advise 
the justice of the peace, that the purpose of the 
adjournment was to facilitate the bedpan vigil. The 
bail hearing was put over for three days and the 
accused was detained in custody. He eventually 
passed the memory  card but it was irreparably 
damaged. No data could be recovered from it.
The police examined the electronic devices seized 
from the accused’s residence for evidence of 
voyeurism and discovered evidence of child 
pornography. A second warrant to conduct further 
searches of the accused’s devices for child 
pornography was obtained. The police then found a 
video of the  accused engaged in a sexual assault on 
an unconscious victim. The hard drive (seized from 
the accused’s apartment),  and an iPod Touch, a 
laptop, and a digital video camera (seized from the 
accused upon arrest) also provided evidence. The 
accused was charged with several offences.
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge found the accused’s s. 8 
Charter rights had been breached. First, 
the warrantless police entry into his 
apartment was unreasonable. Second, the 
telewarrant was invalid and it was quashed. Third, 
the telewarrant did not expressly authorize the 
search of the accused’s electronic devices. 
Nevertheless, the judge found there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to support the 
telewarrant for a search of the accused’s apartment 
because:
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• the accused was likely to return home to view 
the voyeuristic videos;
• the accused may have used his devices to 
transmit data to devices in his home; 
• the accused likely prepared for the offence at 
home; and
• the accused likely had committed other 
voyeurism offences in the past.
Rather than excluding the evidence under s. 24(2), 
the judge decided to stay the charges related to the 
CNE events (voyeurism and obstruction charges) 
but allow the evidence to be admitted on the child 
pornography and sexual assault charges. Effectively, 
the judge separated the breaches into two groups 
and then assigned most of them to the less serious 
offences. He then stayed those offences but allowed 
the more serious offences to proceed. Based 
entirely  on the evidence found on the accused’s 
devices, the accused was convicted of possessing 
child pornography, making child pornography and 
sexual assault. He was sentenced to 40 months in 
prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
t r i a l j udge e r r ed i n no t 
excluding the evidence the 
police obtained as a result of 
the Charter breaches. Justice Nordheimer, 
authoring the Court of Appeal’s decision, noted the 
police had committed numerous Charter violations. 
These included:
1. The failure to give the accused his rights to 
counsel in a timely way;
2. The level 3 strip search for which there were no 
reasonable and probable grounds;
3. The bedpan vigil for which there was no judicial 
authorization;
4. The unlawful detention when the accused’s bail 
hearing was adjourned based on misleading 
information provided to the presiding justice;
5. The warrantless entry into the  accused’s 
apartment;
6. The unlawful search arising from the invalid 
telewarrant that was obtained without full 
disclosure, for which there  was no urgency, and 
which did not require night-time entry; and
7. The unlawful searches of the accused’s devices 
that were undertaken without proper judicial 
authorization.
As for the trial judge’s finding that the  grounds for a 
telewarrant existed, the Court of Appeal disagreed 
and commented on each of the trial judge’s 
findings  as follows:
• The accused was likely to return home to view 
the voyeuristic  videos: “[I]t is difficult to see 
how the [accused] could have returned home to 
view the videos when he was under arrest and 
being detained. However, even if he  could have 
managed that in some way, it is also difficult to 
see how that conduct would justify a search of 
the [accused’s] apartment unless it is assumed 
that he would have transferred any video to 
another device, such that there would then be 
an electronic record of it. The [accused] could 
not have done that himself after his detention, 
and there was no evidence that the devices 
found on his person were configured to transfer 
material automatically or that he did so 
mechanically.”
• The accused may have used his devices to 
transmit data to devices in his home: “[T]here 
was no evidence that the devices that were 
found on the [accused] were  capable of 
transmitting data to the [accused’s] home. 
Certainly, there was nothing contained in the 
ITO to suggest that that was possible. However, 
even if they could have done so, the evidence 
would still be there if the police proceeded to 
obtain a search warrant in the normal course. 
The [accused] was not in a position while 
detained to remotely wipe his devices of data, 
assuming he had the capability to do so. Again, 
there is no suggestion in the ITO of such a 
possibility. There was also no reason to believe 
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that the [accused] was connected to other 
persons, in relation to the suspected offences, 
who would have acted to destroy evidence.”
• The accused likely prepared for the offence at 
home: This did not appear in the ITO for the 
telewarrant and the affiant did not offer any 
subjective belief that would sustain the 
telewarrant being issued for this reason. This 
“might have provided a basis for the telewarrant 
but that would only  have justified a search for 
other stuffed animals or stuffed animal parts. It 
would not have justified a search for other 
recording devices since there was no suggestion 
that other devices were used, or were part of, 
the CNE offences.”
• The accused likely had committed other 
voyeurism offences in the past: This information 
did not appear in the  ITO for the telewarrant and 
the affiant did not offer any subjective belief that 
would sustain the telewarrant being issued for 
this reason. Further, “there was nothing but 
speculation or stereotypical thinking offered in 
support of [this] ground.” 
Nor was there any information in the ITO that 
would have established the necessary urgency to 
justify  a telewarrant or to support a  night-time entry 
and search of the accused’s apartment. 
Good Faith?
The police did not act in good faith throughout 
their investigation. “Many of the Charter breaches 
were clear violations of well-established rules,” 
said Justice  Nordheimer. “Put at its highest, the 
police  conduct was negligent and undertaken in a 
state of oblivion regarding the [accused’s] rights. 
At worst, the police acted in multiple  flagrant 
violations of his rights.”  Improper police conduct 
in this case included:
• The police failed to advise Crown counsel of 
their real reason for wanting an adjournment of 
the accused’s bail hearing — the bed pan vigil.
• The telewarrant affiant did not disclose that the 
accused had remained in custody, which made 
it impossible for him to return home to view the 
voyeuristic video that the police believed he had 
just created. 
• The affiant described the layout of the accused’s 
apartment but did not disclose  that the source 
for this information was the warrantless entry 
undertaken by the police earlier that evening. 
• The police affiant included in the ITO the fact 
that “[t]here are  two previous incidents on file 
with Toronto Police Services involving this 
male”. This suggested to the reader of the ITO 
that the accused had a history  with the police 
that would support the theory that he had a 
propensity to commit similar offences, even in 
the context of the disclosure that he did not 
have a criminal record. But the affiant did not 
reveal that these  incidents involved the police 
responding to a threatened suicide by the 
accused and the accused being the victim of a 
crime. This was a misleading inclusion regarding 
the accused’s prior contact with the police and 
there  was no legitimate reason for including this 
reference in the ITO devoid of the information 
that would put it into a proper context.
In this case, the judge minimized the breaches. The 
s. 8 violations related to two well established areas 
in which a person’s right to privacy is paramount — 
in their home and in their electronic devices. The 
fact that the police did not disturb anyone when 
they illegally entered the accused’s apartment did 
not lessen the invasion of privacy. Nor could the 
search of an individual’s personal electronic 
devices be compared to a search of their sock 
drawer. 
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal agreed with the  accused that 
the evidence ought to have been excluded. The trial 
judge failed to properly consider the cumulative 
effect of the Charter breaches. In excluding the 
evidence, Justice  Nordheimer noted “the breaches 
of the [accused’s] privacy interest in his home, the 
privacy  interest in his devices, and the privacy 
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interest in his body, were all serious ones. In 
addition, this was not a case of a single breach of 
an accused’s rights. Rather, in this case, there were 
multiple breaches”: He continued:
That litany of breaches is remarkable for a 
single arrest on a single event. In my view, it 
reflects a sweeping ignorance by the police of 
the [accused’s] constitutional rights. It also 
demonstrates a course of conduct by the police 
that taints the ultimate discovery of the 
evidence underlying the most serious charges, 
that is, the evidence that was obtained from the 
searches of the devices, particularly the 
external hard drive.
All of this improper conduct began with the 
denial of the [accused’s] right to counsel. That 
denial was based on the same flawed thinking 
that then led to the warrantless entry into the 
[accused’s] apartment. That flawed thinking 
reflects unfounded speculation by the police 
that the [accused] might have connections to 
other individuals who would attempt to destroy 
evidence, if they learned of his arrest. [paras. 
42-43]
In considering the s. 24(2) factors, Justice 
Nordheimer wrote:
• Seriousness of the Charter-infringing police 
conduct: “The Charter breaches set out above 
are breaches of well-settled Charter principles. 
They do not involve grey areas in the law nor do 
they involve new and novel situations. Rather, 
they demonstrate a reckless disregard by the 
police  of fundamental constitutional rights of 
which any police officer ought to be well aware. 
I would add that the conclusion that the police 
were reckless regarding the [accused’s] rights is 
the most favourable view one could take of the 
actions of the police. Viewed unfavourably, the 
police could be seen as intentionally 
disregarding the [accused’s] rights, due to a 
particularly negative reaction to the [accused’s] 
actions and the “type” of person he is.” This 
favoured EXCLUSION.
• Impact of the breaches on the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests: “[The accused’s] 
body, his home, and his personal electronic 
devices, are three areas that attract the highest 
expectations of privacy. In this case, all three 
were invaded, all in the context where the 
accused was also denied his right to counsel. ... 
The breaches were very serious ones.” This 
favoured EXCLUSION.
• Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case 
in its merits. “[This factor] recognizes society’s 
interest in having an adjudication on the merits 
of any criminal offence but especially serious 
criminal offences. At least two of the offences 
here are serious. Nevertheless, society also has a 
strong interest in ensuring that the integrity of 
the administration of justice is maintained. That 
integrity is undermined by police conduct that 
violates citizens’ constitutional rights. If any 
person’s rights are violated, no one’s rights are 
safe. Nor can the ends be allowed to justify the 
means.”
Here, admitting the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The police 
conduct in this case was all part of the same 
investigation and many of the Charter violations 
were committed by the same officer. “The police 
conduct, in this case, was on a single straight line 
from the start of the investigation to the ultimate 
collection of the evidence that underlay all of the 
charges,”  said Justice Nordheimer. “The first 
breach led to the second breach and then to the 
third breach and so on. The breaches led to the 
apartment, then to the devices, and then to finding 
“The Charter breaches set out above are breaches of well-settled Charter 
principles. They do not involve grey areas in the law nor do they involve new 
and novel situations. Rather, they demonstrate a reckless disregard by the police 
of fundamental constitutional rights of which any police officer ought to be well 
aware.”
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what was on those devices. ...  The improper 
conduct of the police tainted all of the evidence.” 
And staying the lesser offences, as the trial judge 
did, while  allowing the more serious offences to 
proceed, might be  viewed as rewarding the 
improper police conduct.
Questioning Police Legal Understanding
The Court of Appeal noted the trial judge actively 
prevented the accused from eliciting evidence that 
might have shown that the police acted in bad 
faith. During the voir dire concerning the search 
warrant, the trial judge precluded the accused’s 
lawyer from asking the police officers questions 
about their understanding of the Charter on the 
basis that these were matters for argument. Justice 
Nordheimer found this to be an error:
The state of the police officer’s knowledge of 
the right breached is relevant to the seriousness 
of a violation. An officer, who violates a Charter 
right while knowing better, commits a flagrant 
breach. For those officers who do not know of 
the relevant right, the reason they do not know 
can properly influence where on the good faith/
bad faith continuum the Charter breach might 
fall. Ignorance may result, for example, from 
disinterest or an absence of care on the part of 
the individual officer, or systemic training 
deficiencies within the police service. The 
result was that counsel for the [accused] was 
prevented from developing the very evidence 
that went to the issue of the good faith of the 
police. [para. 27]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence 
was excluded, his convictions were set aside, and 
acquittals were entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SEIZURE OF HISTORIC TEXT 
MESSAGES DOES NOT REQUIRE 
INVESTIGATIVE NECESSITY
R. v. July, 2020 ONCA 492
A police task  force investigating four 
murders that took place over a 75 
day period identified a prime target 
in the i r inves t iga t ion . Whi le 
analyzing  a cellphone belonging to a 
murder v ic t im, pol ice d i scovered many 
communications between the  victim and a number 
associated with the prime target. The  police 
obtained a production order under s. 487.012 of 
the Criminal Code (now s. 487.014) requiring the 
third-party telephone service provider to produce 
all activity records, subscriber information and text 
messages related to the phone number associated 
with the prime target over about a five month 
period. At the time, the telephone service provider 
retained the content of text messages sent or 
received by its customers.
After examining the records, the police discovered 
text messages related to a cellphone number 
registered to the accused. In these messages, the 
accused and the prime target discussed the 
potential sale of firearms and the previous sale of 
ammunition by the accused to the prime target. 
Based on these text messages, the police then 
obtained an authorization under s. 186 of the 
Criminal Code  to intercept communications 
associated with various numbers. The accused was 
identified as a target and messages sent and 
received on his cellphone were intercepted, 
including communications involving the accused 
selling a revolver with ammunition. After the gun 
sale took place, the police arrested the purchaser 
and found him in possession of a loaded gun the 
accused had sold him. The accused was 
“The state of the police officer’s knowledge of the right breached is relevant to 
the seriousness of a violation. An officer, who violates a Charter right while 
knowing better, commits a flagrant breach. For those officers who do not know 
of the relevant right, the reason they do not know can properly influence where 
on the good faith/bad faith continuum the Charter breach might fall.”
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subsequently arrested and indicted on four counts 
of firearms trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that the text 
messages obtained pursuant to the 
production order were obtained as a 
result of an unreasonable search and 
seizure under s. 8 of the Charter. He submitted that 
a production order was unavailable  for the seizure 
of the content of historical private communications 
unless investigative necessity was established.
The judge, however, dismissed the accused’s s. 8 
Charter application. In the judge’s view, since 
investigative necessity was not a  constitutional 
prerequisite to a wiretap authorization, it was not 
needed to obtain a production order for historic 
text messages. The accused then pled guilty  to one 
count of trafficking a firearm and he was sentenced 
to three years incarceration. 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal recognized 
the accused had the necessary 
standing  to challenge the 
validity of the production order 
and the seizure  of the test messages. Put another 
way, it was accepted that the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical 
text messages stored by the telephone service 
provider.
The accused then put forward two arguments:
1. The police failed to establish the constitutional 
requirement of investigative necessity  when 
they obtained a production order for the 
search and seizure of his historical text 
messages; and
2. The law authorizing the production order was 
arbitrary  and unreasonable due to the different 
requirements for the search and seizure of 
retrospective (historical) as opposed to 
prospective (future) text messages.
Was the Authorizing Law Reasonable?
The accused accepted the search and seizure was 
authorized by law (i.e. historical text messages may 
be the subject of a production order and the police 
met all the prerequisites under s. 487.012). 
However, the accused contended the law itself was 
unreasonable because it did not require the police 
to establish investigative necessity when obtaining 
the production order. He suggested that 
investigative necessity was a  constitutional 
requirement for the seizure  of historical text 
messages because it was a constitutional 
requirement for a wiretap authorization. Since the 
police did not establish investigative necessity  in 
this case, the seizure of the text messages without 
the need to establish investigative necessity  was not 
reasonable and violated s. 8.
BY THE BOOK:
s. 487.014 Criminal Code 
General Production Order
s. 487.014  (1)  Subject to sections 
4 8 7 . 0 1 5 t o 4 8 7 . 0 1 8 , o n  e x 
parte  application made by a peace 
officer or public officer, a justice or 
judge may order a person to produce a document that 
is a copy of a document that is in their possession or 
control when they receive the order, or to prepare and 
produce a document containing data that is in their 
possession or control at that time.
Conditions for making order
(2) Before making the order, the justice or judge must 
be satisfied by information on oath in Form 5.004 that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) an offence has been or will be committed under 
this or any other Act of Parliament; and
(b) the document or data is in the person’s possession 
or control and will afford evidence respecting the 
commission of the offence.
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Investigative Necessity
The Criminal Code allows the police to obtain the 
contents of stored historical text messages by 
means of a production order provided the 
information placed before the judge or justice 
establishes that there  are reasonable grounds to 
believe that: (i) an offence has been or will be 
committed; (ii) the document or data is in the 
person’s possession or control; and (iii) it will afford 
evidence of the commission of the named offence. 
After reviewing case law, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that investigative necessity is not a 
const i tut ional requirement for a judicial 
authorization to intercept prospective private 
communications including text messages 
(commonly referred to as a  wiretap). Rather, 
investigative necessity is a statutory precondition. 
“Based on the cont ro l l ing and se t t l ed 
jurisprudence, investigative  necessity  is not a 
cons t i tu t iona l requ i rement for wi re tap 
authorizations,” said Justice Pepall for the  Court of 
Appeal. “As the jurisprudence does not require 
that investigative necessity be a constitutional 
requirement for wiretaps, it follows that 
investigative necessity is not a constitutional 
requirement for production orders for historical 
text messages.” 
Furthermore, there  were other reasons to reject the 
investigative necessity requirement:
1.  A production order has safeguards: 
i. Statutory conditions must be satisfied;
ii. Issuance is permissive. The presiding justice 
had discretion to grant or refuse the 
requested production order even if the 
statutory conditions are met;
iii.  A presiding justice may impose terms on the 
production order. 
2. An investigative  necessity requirement for all 
seizures of historical text messages would 
unduly hamper the ability of law enforcement to 
investigate and prevent crime without a 
corresponding  benefit to a person’s legitimate 
privacy interests. 
3. An investigative necessity requirement would be 
difficult to reconcile with other Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. 
4. Parliament has not enacted any limitation on the 
ability of law enforcement to use a production 
order to seek historical text messages. 
Prospective v. Retrospective 
The accused also argued that the use of a 
production order to search and seize retrospective 
(historical) text messages — while not available to 
seize prospective (future, non-existent) text 
messages — was an arbitrary distinction that 
rendered its availability  for retrospective  text 
messages unreasonable. This submission, however, 
was rejected.
“Prospective authorization to intercept future 
messages engages a  different mechanism, unique 
privacy  concerns, speculation and surveillance that 
may continue over a prolonged period of time, and 
‘real-time access to information’,”  said Justice 
Pepall. “Historical searches do not share all of 
these characteristics.” Nor is it arbitrary in practice 
because the police could sidestep Part VI 
requirements by waiting until immediately after text 
messages have been exchanged before seeking 
judicial authorization using a production order. 
First, sidestepping is not permissible. Just because a 
search power may be used impermissibly or 
“Based on the controlling and settled jurisprudence, investigative necessity is 
not a constitutional requirement for wiretap authorizations. As the 
jurisprudence does not require that investigative necessity be a constitutional 
requirement for wiretaps, it follows that investigative necessity is not a 
constitutional requirement for production orders for historical text messages.”
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unlawfully, the  lawful and permissible use of the 
power does not violate s. 8. And second, there was 
no evidence about sidestepping in this case or 
otherwise, and therefore the issue did not arise on 
these facts. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SECOND WARRANT NOT 
REQUIRED TO SEARCH 
CELLPHONE
R. v. McNeil, 2020 ONCA 313
Police obtained a search warrant 
under s. 11 of the Controlled Drug 
a n d S u b s t a n c e s A c t ( C D S A ) 
authorizing the search of a  detached 
garage and a house in relation to 
possessing heroin and methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking ofences. The warrant also 
authorized the police to search for and seize 
“Electronic Devices” and to conduct post-seizure 
examinations of those devices based on the 
offences set out in the warrant. The focus of this 
post -seizure examinat ion was electronic 
communications between specified dates, 
including incoming, outgoing, and missed call logs; 
audio, video, and still photograph files; any 
location services; data related to the  use, 
ownership, and access of the phone; and data 
related to the configuration of the mobile phone, 
including internal and external system or program 
configuration.
When police executed the search warrant at the 
garage, they found several people including the 
accused, who was not known to the  officers. She 
was located at the back of the garage where police 
also found most of the drugs seized, including 
heroin, crystal methamphetamine, marihuana and 
cannabis resin. The police also seized four 
electronic devices from the garage including one 
later confirmed as belonging to the accused. Post-
seizure forensic  examinations of the accused’s 
cellphone revealed text messages confirming she 
was engaged in drug trafficking.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought the exclusion of the 
text messages as evidence, alleging her s. 
8 Charter  rights had been breached. 
However, the judge determined that the 
ITO provided the necessary  reasonable grounds for 
issuance, including its authorization for the police 
to conduct a  post-seizure examination of any 
electronic device  found during the search. The 
judge also concluded that the police did not need 
to specifically identify the accused as a target in the 
ITO, nor did they need to get a  second warrant to 
search her phone. And, even if there was a s. 8 
breach, the judge would have admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2). 
The judge ruled the accused jointly possessed the 
heroin and crystal methamphetamine found in the 
garage for the purpose of trafficking and convicted 
her.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again submitted, in 
part, that the examination of her 
cellphone under the warrant 
breached s. 8 and the evidence 
obtained from that examination ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). In her view, even though 
the warrant authorized the seizure of her 
cellphone, the police required a second warrant to 
forensically search it because the justice issuing  the 
original search warrant could not have been 
satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that the examination of any electronic 
device  in the garage would afford evidence of the 
offences. In other words, a cellphone of unknown 
ownership seized under a warrant required a 
second warrant to forensically  examine it. In 
addition, the  accused claimed that the issuing 
justice did not properly consider her privacy 
interests when issuing the original warrant since 
she was not a target. In fact, she was unknown to 
the investigating officers until they searched the 
garage and found her in it. By examining her 
cellphone after it was seized, she  claimed the 
police infringed her s. 8 rights.
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Reasonable Grounds
The Court of Appeal concluded there were 
sufficient reasonable  grounds in the ITO for the 
issuing justice to authorize a  forensic examination 
of any electronic device found during the search of 
the garage, including the accused’s cellphone. 
Justice Jamal, delivering the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal, described the  reasonable grounds standard 
as follows:
The standard of “reasonable grounds to 
believe” does not require proof on a balance of 
probabilities, but rather only a credibly-based 
probability. The ITO must provide “reasonable 
grounds to believe that an offence has been 
committed and that there is evidence to be 
found at the place of the proposed search. … If 
the inferences of criminal conduct and 
recovery of evidence are reasonable on the 
facts disclosed in the ITO, the warrant could be 
issued”.
In making this evaluation, the issuing justice 
considers the ITO as a whole, in a common 
sense, practical, non-technical way, and may 
draw reasonable inferences from its contents. 
The record on a facial challenge is limited to 
the ITO.
A court later reviewing the issuance of a 
warrant does not substitute its opinion for that 
of the issuing justice. It instead asks whether 
“there was reliable evidence that might 
reasonably be believed on the basis of which 
the warrant could – not would – have issued”. 
This involves the reviewing court asking 
“whether there is sufficient credible and 
reliable evidence to permit a justice to find 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that an offence has been committed and that 
evidence of that offence would be found at the 
specified time and place of search”. [references 
omitted, paras. 32-34]
The Court of Appeal agreed there are  unique 
privacy interests raised by computer searches, 
including searches of cellphones. “These privacy 
concerns arise because of the  immense amount of 
personal information that computers can store, 
often automatically generated and retained even 
after a user thinks it is destroyed, and often shared 
by different users and stored almost anywhere  in 
the world,” said Justice  Jamal. As a result, prior 
authorization for computer searches is required 
unlike physical receptacles, such as cupboards or 
filing  cabinets, which can be searched under a 
search warrant authorizing the search of a place 
without specific prior authorization to search the 
particular receptacle. 
In this case, the trial judge found the ITO was 
statutorily and constitutionally sufficient.  The Court 
of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that “the ITO 
contained sufficient information to permit the 
issuing justice to find that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that any electronic devices 
found in the garage would provide evidence of 
drug trafficking.” Cumulatively, the confidential 
informer information, police surveillance and 
investigator experience provided the necessary 
reasonable grounds for the issuing justice to 
authorize a post-seizure examination of any 
electronic device found in the garage.
Moreover, the  ITO did not need to identify  the 
accused as a target of the investigation:
“The standard of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ does not require proof on a 
balance of probabilities, but rather only a credibly-based probability.”
“[A] search warrant is an investigative tool that should be used to unearth as 
much evidence as constitutionally possible about the suspected offence, rather 
than just evidence that incriminates a particular target because that can lead to 
prosecutorial ‘tunnel vision’.”
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... The ITO did not need to mention [the 
accused] or identify her specifically as a target 
for the warrant to authorize a search of her 
phone (though it should have done so had such 
evidence been available). [The accused’s] 
argument reflects a misconception of the 
statutory requirement for the warrant and the 
reasonable grounds standard. The police did 
not have to link the electronic devices to any 
specific target, but rather to the offences under 
investigation. Section 11(1)(d) of the CDSA 
requires the police to demonstrate reasonable 
grounds to believe that the “thing” sought will 
afford “evidence in respect of an offence under 
this Act” (emphasis added). This provision does 
not require the police to show reasonable 
grounds to believe that the thing will afford 
evidence about a specific target or named 
suspect.
Put another way, a search warrant is an 
investigative tool that should be used to 
unearth as much evidence as constitutionally 
possible about the suspected offence, rather 
than just evidence that incriminates a particular 
target because that can lead to prosecutorial 
“tunnel vision”. ... 
Here, whether or not any electronic device 
found in the garage belonged to [the target], the 
ITO provided evidence supporting a credibly-
based probability that any electronic device, if 
found in the garage – a suspected hub of drug 
trafficking – would afford evidence of the drug 
trafficking offences identified in the warrant. 
[paras. 46-48]
And further:
This evidence was therefore sufficient to 
establish reasonable grounds to believe that the 
electronic devices of any persons in the garage 
would contain evidence of the offences under 
investigation, thereby justifying extending the 
warrant to cover any cellphone found in the 
garage, no matter whose. The evidence in the 
ITO was not limited to [the target] and the 
warrant did not target only him, but rather 
targeted the offences under investigation.
The issuing justice was therefore not required to 
consider the specific privacy interests of [the 
accused], who was then unknown to the 
police. The issuing justice was, however, 
required to consider the privacy interests of the 
class of persons whose cell phones might be 
seized from the garage and examined in 
investigating the offences at issue. Here, in 
view of the information presented in the ITO, I 
am satisfied that the issuing justice did so. 
[paras. 50-52]
Was a Second Warrant Required?
The Court of Appeal also ruled the police were not 
constitutionally required to seek a second warrant 
to examine the accused’s cellphone. It concluded 
that the ITO disclosed sufficient information to 
permit the issuing  justice to find that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that any electronic 
devices found in the garage would provide 
evidence of drug trafficking. Because the ITO met 
this standard, a  second warrant to search the 
accused’s phone was not needed. There was no 
constitutional requirement that the police were 
required to apply  for an additional authorization to 
search the accused’s seized device. 
Here, the accused’s s. 8 rights had not been 
breached. The search warrant was constitutionally 
sound in permitting the police  to examine any 
cellphone located during the search of the garage. 
The accused did not need to be named in the ITO 
as a target of the investigation for the warrant to 
authorize the police to examine her phone, nor 
were the police required to obtain a second search 
warrant. Since there was no Charter infringements, 
there was no need to address s. 24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“The mind is the only weapon that 
doesn’t need a holster.”
~Paul Blart~
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2020 British Columbia 
Law Enforcement Memorial 
 
In 1998 the Government of Canada proclaimed the last Sunday in September as Police & Peace Officers’ 
National Memorial Day. On this day every year Canadians are given an opportunity to formally express 
appreciation for the dedication of Law Enforcement Officers who make the ultimate, tragic sacrifice to 
keep communities safe. 
 
Sunday, September 27, 2020 at 1:00 pm 
Ceremony at the BC Legislature in Victoria, BC 
 
Law Enforcement participants to form up in the 800 block of Government Street at 12:00 pm. 
 
For complete events information including annual Memorial Golf Tournament, Ride to Remember 
and Run to Remember visit our website at http://www.bclem.ca 
or   
For details specific to your agency, contact your Ceremonial Sergeant Major 
 
 
 
 
Follow us on: 
 
IMPORTANT UPDATE: Due to the current and ongoing Covid-19 crisis, this year’s Memorial Service will 
be a closed service in order to adhere to the restrictions set out by the Ministry of Health. The service 
itself will be limited to 50 people. More detailed information about a virtual service will be available 
closer to the date of the event. click on BCLEM for more information
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ROADSIDE ‘STRIP SEARCH’ NOT 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. Byfield, 2020 ONCA 515
Pla in c lo thed po l ice o f f i ce r s 
conducted surveillance on a  house 
after receiving a confidential tip from 
an untes ted in former that an 
individual was selling drugs from it. A 
vehicle registered to the accused, who was known 
to an officer from a previous drug investigation, 
arrived at the house and parked in its driveway. 
Police saw a man leave the house and get into the 
passenger seat of the accused’s vehicle. The driver 
and the passenger then switched seats and the car 
was driven to a nearby plaza where it parked. 
Within minutes, a male got out of a green car and 
entered the accused’s car in the rear passenger seat 
on the driver’s side. After about a minute, the male 
got out of the accused’s car and returned to the 
green car. 
Believing they had witnessed a drug transaction, 
the police stopped the accused’s car as it was being 
driven out of the parking lot and arrested both of its 
occupants including the accused who was in the 
front passenger seat.  The accused was patted down 
incident to his arrest but nothing was found. A 
uniformed officer arrived to transport the accused 
to the police station, which was located about four 
minutes away. The transporting officer patted the 
accused down again for the safety of the officer, the 
public, and the accused, and to prevent the 
destruction of evidence. During this second pat 
down, the officer felt a large hard object — about 
six inches by six inches in size — in the accused’s 
groin area. Believing the object was “non-
anatomical”, the officer asked the accused what it 
was. The accused replied, “my dick.” 
Investigating the bulky object further, an officer 
pulled out the waistband of the accused’s pants and 
saw he was wearing a red onesie (long underwear). 
The officer then pulled out the underwear and saw 
a large baggie, which he removed. This baggie 
contained four smaller individual bags of cocaine 
weighing a total of 184 grams. This search lasted 
15-20 seconds according to one officer and less 
than a minute  according to another. The accused’s 
genitals were never exposed and none of his 
clothing  was removed. Two male officers, one on 
each side of the accused, conducted the search at 
the back of a police car adjacent to a large 
snowbank where no civilians saw it. The accused 
was charged with possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.   
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought the exclusion of the 
drugs as evidence under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter by alleging his rights under ss. 8 
and 9 were violated. He submitted the 
police did not have the necessary  reasonable 
grounds to arrest him, thereby breaching his right 
not be arbitrarily detained, and the search that 
followed was unreasonable.  
The judge, however, dismissed the accused’s 
application. First, the judge found the police had 
the requisite reasonable grounds to believe the 
accused had committed a drug trafficking offence 
and could be arrested without a warrant under s. 
495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Not only did the 
officers subjectively  believe they had grounds to 
arrest the vehicle’s occupants, their belief was 
objectively reasonable in the circumstances. These 
factors included the confidential tip about drug 
dealing taking place at the residence, other 
previous (albeit dated) information about drug 
dealing at the residence, awareness that the 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 495(1)(a) Criminal Code 
Arrest Without Warrant By 
Peace Officer
s. 495  (1)  A peace officer may arrest 
without warrant
(a)  a person who has committed an 
indictable offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence; ...
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accused was involved in selling drugs and their 
surveillance observations.
Second, the judge held the personal search in the 
parking lot resulting in the recovery of the drugs 
was a “strip search” even though an officer testified 
he didn’t think it was a strip search. Nevertheless, 
the judge concluded the strip search was 
reasonably conducted as an incident to arrest. The 
judge accepted the concerns offered by police that 
the search was conducted for officer safety reasons, 
and to secure or prevent the destruction of 
evidence. 
As for the manner in which the roadside  search was 
performed, the judge found it did not infringe the 
Charter. He stated:
I am satisfied the roadside strip search of [the 
accused] was reasonable and did not infringe 
upon his s. 8 Charter rights for the following 
reasons:
• The search was conducted in a manner that 
ensured the health and safety of those 
involved;
• The search involved a brief visual inspection 
of [the accused’s] underwear area;
• The officers conducting the search were of 
the same gender as [the accused];
• The number of officers involved was 
appropriate in the circumstances and was 
not excessive;
• [The accused’s] genitals or groin area was 
never exposed;
• While his underwear was rearranged, the 
waistband of [the accused’s] pants and 
underwear were pulled out minimally and 
briefly;
• No articles of clothing were ever removed 
from [the accused]. He was not required to 
pull down his pants;
• The search was done as quickly as possible 
(15 to 20 seconds [to] under a minute ...);
• In the circumstances, authorization from an 
officer in an authorizing or advising 
capacity was not necessary;
• There is no evidence that any member of 
the public witnessed any part or details of 
the search;
• Given the location of [the police] cruiser, 
the location of [the officers and the 
accused] at the back of the cruiser, adjacent 
to the large snowbank in the parking lot, the 
search was quick, discrete and with due 
consideration for [the accused’s] privacy 
rights;
• The search was minimally intrusive and 
justified the reasonable and probable 
grounds that [the accused] was trafficking in 
drugs.  Both officer safety and preservation 
of evidence justified this brief search;
• There is no evidence to suggest the search 
was aggressive or humiliating. [R. v. Byfield, 
2019 ONSC 3954, para. 217]
The accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 24 
months’ imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody, 
plus other ancillary orders.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
m o t i o n j u d g e e r r e d i n 
concluding  that his arrest was 
lawful and the resultant strip 
search was reasonable. In his view, his rights under 
both ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter  had been breached 
and the evidence out to have been excluded under 
s. 24(2). 
The Arrest
The accused contended that the grounds offered for 
his arrest were insufficient. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed. The motion judge properly considered 
the confidential tip by  assessing  whether it was 
compelling, credible and corroborated. 
Charter of Rights
s. 9 Everyone has the right 
not to be arbitrarily 
detained or 
imprisoned. 
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“The motion judge was aware of the shortcomings 
in the background information in the possession of 
the police,”  said the Court of Appeal. “However, 
this source of information did not bear the entire 
load of the reasonable  grounds requirement in this 
case. Prior to making the vehicle stop, the police 
witnessed what they reasonably believed was a 
drug transaction.” The totality of the  evidence 
supported the motion judge’s conclusion that the 
police had the reasonable  grounds required   by   s. 
495(1)(a). The arrest was therefore lawful and did 
not violate s. 9 of the Charter.
The Strip Search
The Court of Appeal also upheld the motion judge’s 
ruling that the strip search was not unreasonable. 
First, the pat down by the transporting officer was 
appropriate. Second, even though the searching 
officer mistakenly believed that the mere 
“rearrangement”  of clothing did not constitute a 
strip search, the motion judge did not err in 
ultimately concluding that the strip search was 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
“The search was conducted in a manner that 
ensured the health and safety of the [accused],” 
highlighted the Court of Appeal. “It involved a brief 
(15 seconds to a minute) visual inspection of the 
[accused’s] underwear area; the searching officer 
was the same gender as the [accused]; the 
[accused’s] genitals were never exposed; no 
articles of clothing were removed; no member of 
the public witnessed any part of the details of the 
search because it was conducted between a police 
cruiser and a large snowbank; and there was no 
evidence to suggest that the search was 
gratuitously aggressive or humiliating.” 
Moreover, the  transporting officer’s safety 
concerns were legitimate. “Given his 
discovery of the  unknown object in the 
[ a c c u s e d ’s ] g r o i n a r e a , f u r t h e r 
investigation was reasonable  and 
necessary,” said the Appeal Court. “We 
disagree with the [accused’s] submission 
that, because the police station was only 
four minutes away, the strip search could 
have waited until then. The strip search 
was necessary to ensure  the safety of all 
concerned … during this journey to the police 
station, even if that journey was to be brief.”
Since there were no Charter breaches, there  was no 
need to consider s. 24(2). The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Byfield, 2019 ONSC 3954.
What is a Strip Search?
In R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 the Supreme Court of 
Canada adopted the following as meaning of the 
term “strip search”:
“[T]he removal or rearrangement of some 
or all of the clothing of a person so as to 
permit a visual inspection of a person’s 
private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, 
breasts (in the case of a female), or 
undergarments.” [para. 47]
The Supreme Court added:
“This definition distinguishes strip searches 
from less intrusive ‘frisk’ or ‘pat-down’ 
searches, which do not involve the removal 
of clothing, and from more intrusive body 
cavity searches, which involve a physical 
inspection of the detainee’s genital or anal 
regions. While the mouth is a body cavity, it 
is not encompassed by the term ‘body cavity 
search’.   Searches of the mouth do not 
involve the same privacy concerns, although 
they may raise other health concerns for 
both the detainee and for those conducting 
the search.” [para. 47]
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
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Strip searches can be conducted as an incident to arrest provided:
1. they are conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons in the arrestee’s possession or 
evidence related to the arrest, 
2. the police establish reasonable  grounds justifying the strip search in addition to reasonable 
grounds justifying the arrest; and 
3. the strip search is carried out in a reasonable manner.  
Moreover, a strip search should be conducted at a police station unless there are exigent 
circumstances requiring it be conducted in the field — prior to being transported to a police station). 
The Supreme Court of Canada also offered a series of guidelines, which they articulated in the form of 
questions, to be considered in determining whether a strip search is conducted in a reasonable 
manner:
1. Can the strip search be conducted at the police station and, if not, why not?
2. Will the strip search be conducted in a manner that ensures the health and safety  of all 
involved?
3. Will the strip search be authorized by a police officer acting in a supervisory capacity?
4. Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) carrying out the strip search are of the same 
gender as the individual being searched?
5. Will the number of police officers involved in the search be no more than is reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances? 
6. What is the minimum of force necessary to conduct the strip search?
7. Will the strip search be  carried out in a private area such that no one other than the 
individuals engaged in the search can observe the search? 
8. Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as possible and in a way that ensures that the 
person is not completely undressed at any one time?
9. Will the  strip search involve only a visual inspection of the arrestee’s genital and anal areas 
without any physical contact?
10. If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a weapon or evidence in a body cavity (not 
including the mouth), will the detainee be  given the option of removing the object himself or 
of having the object removed by a trained medical professional?
11. Will a proper record be kept of the  reasons for and the manner in which the strip search was 
conducted?
R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly 
receiving the In Service: 10-8 
newsletter by email. You can sign up 
by clicking here. This will take you to 
the free Subscription Form that only 
requires an email. 
Also 
visit 
the 
online 
archive.
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BC ILLICT DRUG TOXICITY 
DEATHS IN 2020
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug  toxicity deaths (formerly 
known as illicit drug overdose deaths) in the 
province from January 1, 2010 to July 31, 2020. 
In July 2020 there were 175 suspected drug toxicity 
deaths. This represents a  +136% increase over the 
number of deaths occurring in July 2019 and two 
(+2) more deaths than June 2020.
In 2020, there  have been a total of 909 suspected 
drug overdose deaths from January to July. This is 
an increase of  291 deaths over the 2019 numbers 
for the same time period (618). 
People aged 30-39 have been the hardest hit in 
2020 with 214 illicit drug toxicity deaths followed 
by 40-49 year-olds (210) and 50-59 years-old 
(197).  People aged 19-29 had 180  deaths while 
60-69 year olds had 87  deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 223  followed by Surrey (113), 
Victoria (84), Kelowna (33), Kamloops (32) 
Abbotsford (26), and Nanaimo (24).   
Overall, the 2020 statistics amount to about four (4) 
people dying every day of the year.
Males continue to die at a 4:1  ratio compared to 
females. From January to July 2020, 772 males had 
died while there were 187 female deaths.
The January to July 2020 
data indicated that most 
illicit drug toxicity deaths 
(85%) occurred inside 
while 14% occurred 
outside. For 14 deaths, 
t h e l o c a t i o n w a s 
unknown. 
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
July 2019 July 2020
175
74
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
Jan-Jul 2019 Jan-Jul 2020
909
618
+136%
+47%
illicit Drug Overdose Deaths
50
100
150
200
May June July
175177174
7476
88
2019 2020
21%
79%
Males
Females
Deaths by gender
Volume 20 Issue 4 ~ July/August 2020
PAGE 43
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 52 months preceding the 
declaration (Dec 2011-Mar 2016) totaled 1,745. 
The number of deaths in the 52 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Jul 2020) totaled 5,707. 
This is an increase of more than 220%.
14126
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Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Jul 2020
Source: Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths in BC - January 1, 2010 to July 
31, 2020.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 
Coroners Service. August 25, 2020.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2019 were  fentanyl and its 
analogues, which was detected in 82.8%  of deaths, cocaine (49.8%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(33.9%), ethyl alcohol (27.8%), heroin (15.0%) and methadone (6.6%). Other opioids (17.4%) and other 
drugs (16.2%) were also detected. 
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